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INTRODUCTION 
Antitrust policy today is an anomaly.  On the one hand, antitrust is 
thriving.  The past twenty years witnessed more countries with antitrust 
laws, and the birth and growth of the international organization of 
governmental competition authorities, the International Competition 
Network (“ICN”), with over 100 member countries.1  China, which viewed 
until the late 1970s the term competition pejoratively as a “capitalist 
monster,” now has competition laws.2  Domestically, the U.S. Department 
of Justice Antitrust Division, decimated during the Reagan administration,3 
has more prosecutors today than in the 1960s.4  Its 2010 budget, adjusted 
                                                 
1
 Int’l Competition Network Steering Grp., The ICN’s Vision for its Second Decade, 
Presented at the 10th Annual Conference of the ICN (May 2011), 
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc755.pdf. 
2
 Xiaoye Wang, The New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law: A Survey of a Work in 
Progress, 54 ANTITRUST BULL. 579, 580 (2009). 
3
 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: CHANGES IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND 
ACTIVITIES 4 (1990), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GGD-91-2 (“Between 
fiscal years 1980 and 1989, the Division staff declined from 883 (including 429 attorneys) 
to 468 (including 209 attorneys).”). 
4
 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., FY 2012 Congressional Budget Submission 48 
(2011) (Antitrust Division’s 2012 budget had 880 authorized employee positions, of which 
390 were for attorneys), www.justice.gov/jmd/2012justification/pdf/fy12-atr-
justification.pdf; Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE 
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for inflation, is more than triple its 1965 level.5  The American Bar 
Association’s Antitrust Section boasts over 8,000 “attorneys and non-
lawyers from private law firms, in-house counsel, non-profit organizations, 
consulting firms, federal and state government agencies, as well as judges, 
professors and law students.”6  No other country affords private antitrust 
plaintiffs the combination of (i) broad civil discovery largely determined by 
the parties, rather than the courts,7 (ii) the ability to lower individual 
litigation costs by bringing antitrust claims, at times, as a class,8 (iii) 
automatic treble damages,9 (iv) recovery of the costs of a successful suit, 
including reasonable attorney’s fees,10 (v) broad injunctive relief,11 (vi) a 
per se illegal standard for evaluating price-fixing and other “hard-core” 
cartel behavior,12 (vii) expansive jurisdictional rules, and (viii) the use of 
collateral estoppel for follow-on private antitrust suits.13  
Yet antitrust’s influence in the U.S. has diminished.  One used to hear of 
antitrust’s importance.  The Supreme Court once called the federal antitrust 
                                                                                                                            
PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 194 (Vintage 2008) (noting 
300 Antitrust Division lawyers in 1962).  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which 
enforces both consumer protection and competition law, had 600 lawyers at the end of its 
2010 fiscal year.  Fed. Trade Comm’n, Performance & Accountability Report--Fiscal Year 
2010, at 6 (Nov. 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/11/par.shtm. 
5
 Appropriation Figures for the Antitrust Division, Fiscal Years 1903-2012, 
www.justice.gov/atr/public/atr-appropriation-figures.html.  The Division’s 2010 budget 
was $163,170,000. Its 1965 budget was $7,072,000 (id.), which adjusted for inflation, 
equals approximately $48.9 million in 2010 dollars. DollarTimes, Inflation Calculator 
(Aug. 3. 2011), http://www.dollartimes.com/calculators/inflation.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 
2011).  
6
 AM. BAR ASS’N SEC. OF ANTITRUST LAW, WHO WE ARE, 
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/home.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2011). 
7
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37. 
8
 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
9
 15 U.S.C. § 15. 
10
 Id. 
1115 U.S.C. § 26. 
12
 United States v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
13
 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (if the U.S. brings a civil or criminal antitrust action, and 
testimony is taken, then any resulting final judgment or consent decree can be used as 
prima facie evidence against defendants for the same conduct in later private antitrust 
actions). 
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laws “the Magna Carta of free enterprise” in preserving economic freedom 
and the free-enterprise system.14  Today the Court complains about antitrust 
suits,15 and places greater faith in the antitrust function being subsumed in a 
regulatory framework.16  Presidential candidates once debated antitrust 
policy.  Now candidates rarely mention, much less debate, antitrust policy.17 
Americans once had “a deep feeling of unrest” and fear of “another kind of 
slavery” from the aggregations of capital in the hands of a few individuals 
and corporations.18  By the mid-1960s antitrust became “complex, difficult, 
and boring.”19  By 2003–4, many younger Americans were unconcerned 
about economic concentration.20  Among the factors to explain this 
disparity, Gallup’s chief economist identified the federal government not 
                                                 
14
 United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
15
 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 895 (2007) 
(complaining that antitrust’s per se illegal standard might increase litigation costs by 
promoting “frivolous” suits); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 281-
82 (2007) (fearing “unusually” high risk of inconsistent results by antitrust courts); Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-60 (2007) (antitrust’s “inevitably costly and 
protracted discovery phase,” as hopelessly beyond effective judicial supervision) (quoting 
Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2003)); 
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 
(2004) (decrying antitrust’s “interminable litigation”). 
16
 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1124 (2009) (Breyer, 
J., concurring) (when a “regulatory structure exists to deter and remedy anticompetitive 
harm, the costs of antitrust enforcement are likely to be greater than the benefits”); Credit 
Suisse, 551 U.S. at 283; Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414-15; see also Edward D. Cavanagh, The 
Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons From The American Experience, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
629, 636 (2010). 
17
 Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1390-98 (2009) (discussing Wilson-Taft-Roosevelt debate over rule-
of-reason standard, and Reagan administration’s departure from earlier Republican 
administrations in antitrust enforcement). 
18
 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 83 (1911) (Harlan, J. 
dissenting). 
19
 Hofstadter, supra note 4, at 189. 
20
 Linda Lyons, Youthful Optimism? Young Americans Happy with “Big Business,” 
Gallup, Mar. 2, 2004, http://www.gallup.com/poll/10816/Youthful-Optimism-Young-
Americans-Happy-Big-Business.aspx.  Fifty-four percent of the Americans (ages 18 to 29) 
were very or somewhat satisfied with the size and influence of major corporations, which 
was fifteen percentage points higher than the next-most optimistic age group (30- to 49-
year-olds), and satisfaction with major corporations decreased even more among the older 
age groups. 
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pursuing monopolies the way it once did (therefore, younger people did not 
have such a negative view of monopolies) and that the antitrust laws were 
not emphasized in business school the way they once were.21  Few people 
apparently followed the Government’s trial against Microsoft.22  When the 
consent decree expired in 2011, several questioned what the remedy 
accomplished.23 
So as historian Richard Hofstadter asked in the mid-1960s, what 
happened to the antitrust movement in the United States?  “[O]nce the 
United States had an antitrust movement without antitrust prosecutions,” 
observed Hofstadter; by the 1960s, there were “antitrust prosecutions 
without an antitrust movement.”24  Today we have far fewer antitrust 
prosecutions without an antitrust movement.  Since the 1970s, the number 
of private antitrust lawsuits25 and DOJ investigations under Sections 126 and 
                                                 
21
 Id. 
22
 Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Campaign Incidents Have Little 
Punch (Dec. 16, 1999) (only 11 percent of surveyed said they followed reports of the 
antitrust trial against Microsoft), http://people-press.org/report/?pageid=253. 
23
 Jay Greene, Microsoft Oversight Ends With Little to Show for Effort, CNET, May 12, 
2011, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10805_3-20062079-75.html#ixzz1RFoy76X9; Robert H. 
Lande & Norman W. Hawker, As Antitrust Case Ends, Microsoft is Victorious in Defeat, 
BALTIMORE SUN, May 16, 2011. 
24
 Hofstadter, supra note 4, at 189. 
25
 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, tbl. 5.41.2010 (2010), 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t5412010.csv. 
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227 of the Sherman Act has declined.  
Within the U.S. legal academy, antitrust’s significance has diminished.  
The number of law journal articles that mention antitrust, the Sherman Act, 
or the Clayton Act steadily increased after the 1930s, peaked between 1980-
84 (when the Reagan administration embraced the Chicago School 
paradigm), and steadily declined thereafter.28  The same trend appears in the 
                                                                                                                            
 
 
Source: U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division Workload Statistics, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workload-statistics.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2011). The 
number does not include FTC investigations or capture the DOJ investigation’s success or 
impact. Kenneth M. Davidson, AAI Senior Fellow, Commentary: Numerology and the 
Mismeasurement of Competition Laws (Sept. 29 2008), 
www.antitrustinstitute.org/node/11012 (critiquing reliance on antitrust enforcement 
statistics). 
27
 Antitrust Division Workload Statistics, supra note 26. 
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frequency of books published since the 1930s
                                        
Source: Citations in Heinonline, Most
http://home.heinonline.org
(i) antitrust articles could appear more frequently in specialty and other law journals; and 
(ii) the number of articles does not necessarily equate with the articles’ significance.
29
 A search of books on 
(http://ngrams.googlelabs.com/info
have occurred in a corpus of books
similar trend for the term antitrust, with an earlier peak for the number of books mentioning 
the Sherman Act and Clayton Act:
In contrast, the term law
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FTC, or DOJ’s Antitrust Division.30  After a string of Supreme Court 
defeats for antitrust plaintiffs, the cover of the ABA’s fall 2007 ANTITRUST 
magazine asked The End of Antitrust As We Know It? One antitrust lawyer 
wrote,  
The rhetoric and, arguably, the enforcement records of the 
agencies—outside the cartel area—are less activist now than at any 
time in recent years. No one would seriously suggest that we are 
witnessing the end of antitrust. But is it the end of antitrust as we 
once knew it, at least in the United States? If so, how should we 
feel about it?31 
 
What explains this anomaly?  Why is antitrust growing internationally, 
yet declining domestically?  There are two important factors.  The first is 
salience, especially the salience of the U.S. antitrust’s goals.  U.S. antitrust 
policy has roughly twenty to thirty year-long cycles: (i) after initial 
dormancy, 1900—1920, the promise of antitrust; (ii) 1920s—mid-1930s, 
antitrust dormancy in the boom and bust years; (iii) mid-1940s—1970s, 
antitrust representing “the Magna Carta of free enterprise” in preserving 
economic and political freedom; and (iv) late-1970s—2010, antitrust’s 
contraction under the Chicago and post-Chicago Schools’ neoclassical 
economic theories.32  In the last cycle, some enforcers viewed antitrust’s 
                                                 
30
 A similar trend exists for the terms FTC and DOJ’s Antitrust Division: 
 
Google Books Ngram Viewer, http://ngrams.googlelabs.com. 
31
 Mark D. Whitener, Editor’s Note: The End of Antitrust? ANTITRUST 5 (Fall 2007).  
32
 Maurice E. Stucke, Antitrust 2025, CPI ANTITRUST J. (Dec. 2010), available at 
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more salient political, social, and moral goals as diluting antitrust principles.  
Along with antitrust’s non-economic goals went its historic concern about 
arresting economic power in its incipiency.  
A second factor is that antitrust policy during the past policy cycle 
relied on an incomplete, distorted conception of competition. Adopting the 
Chicago School’s simplifying assumptions of self-correcting markets 
composed of rational, self-interested market participants, courts and 
enforcers sacrificed important political, social, and moral values to promote 
certain economic beliefs. They accepted the increased risks from 
concentrated telecommunications,33 financial,34 and radio35 industries, 
among others, for the prospect of future efficiencies and innovation.36  They 
ignored an important antitrust concern, namely the Bailout Dilemma.37  
With the anger over taxpayer bailouts for firms deemed too-big-and-
integral-to-fail, the wealth inequality that accelerated during the last policy 
cycle,38 and the current budget cuts and austerity measures, the United 
                                                                                                                            
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1727251. 
33
 TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 
(2010). 
34
 SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS:  THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND 
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 12, 203 (2010); Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Lessons for 
Competition Law from the Economic Crisis: The Prospect for Antitrust Responses to the 
“Too-Big-To-Fail” Phenomenon, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 261, 291 (2011). 
35
 Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Why More Antitrust Immunity for the Media 
is a Bad Idea, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 115 (2010). 
36
 Mercury News Wire Services, Bigness Is Not Bad White House and Greenspan 
Defend Mergers, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 17, 1998, available at 1998 WLNR 
1705551. 
37
 Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Antitrust, Ideology, and the Arabesques of 
Economic Theory, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 268-69 (1995) (“economic power’s capacity 
to obtain government bailouts—regardless of how incompetent, inefficient, and 
unprogressive those who wield it may be—as the ultimate perversion of private 
enterprise”). 
38
 G. William Domhoff, Power in America, Wealth, Income, and Power (Sept. 2005 & 
updated Apr. 2010), http://sociology.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html (“As of 
2007, the top 1% of households (the upper class) owned 34.6% of all privately held wealth, 
and the next 19% (the managerial, professional, and small business stratum) had 50.5%, 
which means that just 20% of the people owned a remarkable 85%, leaving only 15% of 
the wealth for the bottom 80% (wage and salary workers”)). 
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States is ripe for a new antitrust policy cycle.  If so, what will drive it? 
Two issues drove past cycles and will likely drive the next one:  What is 
competition, and what are the goals of competition law?  Only after 
policymakers reconsider what is competition39 and the goals of competition 
law, can they answer the third question, what should be the legal standards 
and rules to promote these goals.  Accordingly, this article calls for 
policymakers to reconsider antitrust’s goals. 
Part I summarizes the shift during the last policy cycle from embracing 
multiple political, social, moral, and economic goals to the current debate 
over a single economic goal.  Part II discusses why four oft-cited economic 
goals (ensuring an effective competitive process, promoting consumer 
welfare, maximizing efficiency, and ensuring economic freedom) failed to 
unify antitrust analysis.  Part III discusses why it is unrealistic to believe 
that a single well-defined antitrust objective exists.  Part IV proposes how to 
account antitrust’s multiple policy objectives into the legal framework.  It 
outlines a blended goal approach, the risks of this approach, and its benefits 
in providing better legal standards and reviving antitrust’s salience. 
I. ANTITRUST’S GOALS 
A.  Importance in Defining Antitrust’s Objectives 
The battle over antitrust begins with its goals.  As the Chicago School 
recognized, defining the goals of antitrust is paramount: “Everything else 
follows from the answer we give.”40  Defining antitrust’s objectives serves 
several important purposes. 
First, the antitrust objectives inform the law’s enforcement and 
                                                 
39
 Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Competition, MISS. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1646151 (showing how no satisfactory 
comprehensive definition of competition exists, and how varying one premise of 
competition--the relative rationality of market firms and consumers–yields different 
conceptions of competition). 
40
 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 50  
(1978). 
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application.41  The objectives can shape enforcement policy and priorities. 
They can inform policymakers of any gaps between actual outcomes from 
current enforcement and desired outcomes.  They can assist the courts in 
applying the antitrust legal standards to assure that the result is aligned with 
the objectives. 
Second, to the extent measurable and transparent, the objectives can 
increase the accountability of government antitrust enforcers, “increase 
transparency and facilitate reasoned debate to the extent that they make 
explicit the rationales for decisions in individual cases.”42 
Finally, in any jurisdiction with multiple enforcers (such as federal and 
state antitrust agencies in the U.S.), defining objectives ensures that the 
antitrust enforcers (and other law enforcement officials) are not thwarting 
each other’s efforts.  One agency can increase enforcement when another is 
lax, but all the enforcement is directed toward consistent objectives.43 
B.  Antitrust’s Historical Goals 
With the Supreme Court’s gloss, Section One of the Sherman Act 
punishes “unreasonable” restraints of trade.44  Section Two of the Sherman 
Act prohibits a company to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . 
trade or commerce.”45  Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and 
acquisitions when the effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or 
to tend to create a monopoly.”46  Unlike other countries’ antitrust statutes,47 
                                                 
41
 AM. BAR ASS’N, SEC. OF ANTITRUST LAW, REPORT ON ANTITRUST POLICY 
OBJECTIVES (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-
comments/2003/reports/policyobjectives.pdf [hereinafter ANTITRUST GOALS]. 
42
 Id. 
43
 LUDWIG VON MISES, BUREAUCRACY 70 (2007). 
44
 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
45
 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
46
 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
47
 See, e.g., Anti-monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. I (adopted 
Aug. 30, 2007) (law enacted “for the purpose of preventing and restraining monopolistic 
conducts, protecting fair competition in the market, enhancing economic efficiency, 
safeguarding the interests of consumers and social public interest, promoting the healthy 
12 RECONSIDERING ANTITRUST’S GOALS [11-Aug-11 
the U.S. antitrust laws do not identify specific objectives.  An 
“unreasonable” restraint ultimately reflects a normative judgment of what is 
unreasonable. 
Nor does the legislative history identify a single objective.48  Hofstadter, 
for example, categorized antitrust’s goals as (i) economic (competition 
maximizes “economic efficiency”), (ii) political (antitrust principles 
“intended to block private accumulations of power and protect democratic 
government”), and (iii) social and moral (competitive process was 
“disciplinary machinery” for character development).49 
The political, social, and moral goals were salient after World War II 
given the cartels in Nazi Germany colluding with U.S. firms.50  Congress, in 
passing section 7 of the Clayton Act and in its 1950 Celler-Kefauver Anti-
Merger amendment, “was concerned with arresting concentration in the 
                                                                                                                            
development of the socialist market economy”); Netherlands Competition Auth., 
Competition Enforcement and Consumer Welfare Setting the Agenda 14 (2011), 
www.atp.nl/nma/image.php?id=146&type=pdf [hereinafter 2011 ICN Survey]. 
48
 Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, 
What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1191 (1977). 
49
 HOFSTADTER, supra note 4, at 199-200; AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 412 (2005) (discussing how the direct election of U.S. 
senators was to counter the “undue effects of large corporations, monopolies, trusts, and 
other special interest groups in the Senate election process”); Frank Maier-Rigaud, On the 
Normative Foundations of Competition Law: Efficiency, Political Freedom and the 
Freedom to Compete (May 2, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1829023; 
Thomas J. Horton, The Coming Extinction of Homo Economicus and the Eclipse of the 
Chicago School of Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary Biology to Structural and Behavioral 
Antitrust Analyses, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 469, 503-4 (2011). 
50
 F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM: TEXT AND DOCUMENTS--THE DEFINITIVE 
EDITION 187-92 (2007); WENDELL BERGE, CARTELS: CHALLENGE TO A FREE WORLD 
(1944); Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 497; Message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Congress Transmitting 
Recommendations Relative to the Strengthening and Enforcement of Antitrust Laws, Apr. 
29. 1938, S. Doc. No. 173, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938), reprinted in I.iv THE 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 3404 
(Earl W. Kintner ed. 1978) (“liberty of a democracy is not safe if the people tolerate the 
growth of private power to a point where it becomes stronger than their democratic state 
itself”). 
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American economy, whatever its cause, in its incipiency.”51  Congress’ fear 
was “not only of accelerated concentration of economic power on economic 
grounds, but also of the threat to other values a trend toward concentration 
was thought to pose.”52 
In reviewing the Sherman Act’s legislative history, the Court noted 
Congress’s non-economic concerns about the concentration of wealth and 
power in the hands of the few.53  The Sherman Act, found the Court, sought 
to 
• prevent the concentration of markets through acquisitions,54 and 
“perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of 
possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which 
can effectively compete with each other;”55  
 
• protect firms’ “right of freedom to trade;”56   
 
• promote consumer welfare, allocative efficiency and price 
competition;57  
                                                 
51
 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 551 (1966). 
52
 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 316 (1962); H.R. REP. NO. 1191, 
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (prohibiting relationships that deprive rivals a fair opportunity to 
compete); KENNETH M. DAVIDSON, REALITY IGNORED:  HOW MILTON FRIEDMAN AND 
CHICAGO ECONOMICS UNDERMINED AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND ENDANGERED THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 9 (2011). 
53
 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
54
 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 374. 
55
 Id.; see also United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 275 (1966) (“[l]ike 
the Sherman Act in 1890 and the Clayton Act in 1914, the basic purpose of the 1950 
Celler-Kefauver Act was to prevent economic concentration in the American economy by 
keeping a large number of small competitors in business”); United States v. Aluminum Co. 
of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (“possible, because of its indirect social or moral 
effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his success upon his own 
skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those engaged must accept the 
direction of a few”). 
56
 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
57
 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221 (1993) 
(“antitrust laws’ traditional concern for consumer welfare and price competition”); Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) 
(“Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription’”) (quoting 
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979)) (quoting BORK, supra note 40); 
Associated Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 
459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983) (“assure customers the benefits of price competition”); 
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• “protect the public from the failure of the market;”58 
 
• preserve economic freedom59 and the freedom for each business 
“to compete-to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and 
ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster;”60 
 
• condemn practices that “completely shut[] out competitors, not 
only from trade in which they are already engaged, but from the 
opportunities to build up trade in any community where these 
great and powerful combinations are operating under this system 
and practice;”61 
 
• “secure equality of opportunity and to protect the public against 
evils commonly incident to destruction of competition through 
monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade;”62 and  
 
• “be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at 
preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.”63 
 
While concerned of higher prices and less initiative from monopolies, 
                                                                                                                            
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 308 (3d Cir. 2007) (“primary goal of 
antitrust law is to maximize consumer welfare by promoting competition among firms); 
L.A.P.D., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Corp., 132 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Antitrust law is 
designed to protect consumers from the higher prices-and society from the reduction in 
allocative efficiency-that occurs when firms with market power curtail output.”); Rebel Oil 
Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1445 (9th Cir. 1995) (characterizing allocative 
efficiency as synonymous with consumer welfare and as “the central goal of the Sherman 
Act”); J. Allen Ramey, M.D., Inc. v. Pac. Found. For Med. Care, 999 F. Supp. 1355, 1364 
(S.D. Cal. 1998); Ginzburg v. Mem’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 998, 1015 (S.D. 
Tex. 1997) (“purpose of antitrust law is the promotion of consumer welfare”) (quoting 
Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas, 899 F.2d 951, 960 (10th Cir.1990)). 
58
 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993). 
59
 Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 538; Kochert v. Greater Lafayette 
Health Services, Inc., 463 F.3d 710, 715 (7th Cir. 2006); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust 
Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 904 (6th Cir. 2003); SigmaPharm, Inc. v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 772 F. 
Supp. 2d 660 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
60
 United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
61
 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 10 n.15 (1984) (quoting 
H.R.Rep. No. 63-627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 12-13 (1914)). 
62
 Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters of U.S. & Canada, 260 U.S. 501, 
512 (1923). 
63
 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 
104 n. 27 (1984) (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958)). 
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courts also expressed social and political concerns of monopolies, including 
impoverishing individuals of their livelihood.64 Even if monopolies were 
beneficent, opportunity, and liberty remain limited.65  
C.  The Quest for a Single Antitrust Goal 
Although economists were ambivalent when the Sherman Act was 
enacted,66 and even though the Act’s legislative history encompassed non-
economic concerns,67 in the past policy cycle, Richard Posner, Robert Bork 
                                                 
64
 United States v. Vandebrake, CR10-4025-MWB, 2011 WL 488690 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 
8, 2011) (quoting United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 536 (1948) (Douglas, 
J., dissenting) (“Industrial power should be decentralized. It should be scattered into many 
hands so that the fortunes of the people will not be dependent on the whim or caprice, the 
political prejudices, the emotional stability of a few self-appointed men. The fact that they 
are not vicious men but respectable and social minded is irrelevant. That is the philosophy 
and the command of the Sherman Act.”); United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 
270, 274 (1966) (“From this country’s beginning there has been an abiding and widespread 
fear of the evils which flow from monopoly—that is the concentration of economic power 
in the hands of a few.”); United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553–54 
(1944) (“‘Trusts’ and ‘monopolies’ were the terror of the period.  Their power to fix prices, 
to restrict production, to crush small independent traders, and to concentrate large power in 
the few to the detriment of the many, were but some of numerous evils ascribed to them.”); 
Bepex Corp. v. Black Clawson Co., 713 F.2d 202, 204 (6th Cir. 1983) (“One freedom 
which the colonists sought in 1776 was freedom from monopolies.”); United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (Congress not necessarily 
actuated by economic motives alone and concerned about monopolies’ indirect social and 
moral effect); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898) 
(Monopolies “deprive the public of the services of men in the employments and capacities 
in which they may be most useful to the community as well as themselves.”) (quoting 
Alger v. Thacher, 19 Pick. 51, 54 (1837)); see also Case of Monopolies, (1602) 77 Eng. 
Rep. 1260, 1263 (K.B.) (if monopolies flourish, workers, who maintained for their 
families, “will of necessity be constrained to live in idleness and beggary”); Mitchel v. 
Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 350 (Ch.) (deprives public of useful member). 
65
 See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 421 (1992) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (“The basic economic policy of the Nation is one favoring competitive 
markets in which individual entrepreneurs are free to make their own decisions concerning 
price and output.”). 
66
 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 58 (4th ed. 2011) (concepts of allocative efficiency and 
deadweight loss “were almost certainly not known to the framers of the Sherman Act”); 
George J. Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 3 
(1982) (“A careful student of the history of economics would have searched long and hard, 
on July 2 of 1890, the day the Sherman Act was signed by President Harrison, for any 
economist who had ever recommended the policy of actively combatting collusion or 
monopolization in the economy at large.”). 
67
 For further discussion of the Sherman Act’s legislative history, including Judge 
Bork’s interpretation and the criticisms thereto, see generally Daniel R. Ernst, The New 
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and other Chicago School scholars pursued a quest for a single unifying 
economic goal.68  Antitrust’s whole task was “the effort to improve 
allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so greatly as 
to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare.”69  
Their economic goal was consistent with their largely static conception 
of competition, strong belief in the rationality of market participants, 
skepticism over the likelihood and extent of market failures, and doubts of 
the government’s institutional capacities.70  With their faith in lightly 
regulated markets, they saw a limited role for antitrust, and accordingly 
marginalized antitrust’s political, moral, and social goals.71  By the early 
2000s, Posner surmised that 
[a]lmost everyone professionally involved in antitrust today--
whether as litigator, prosecutor, judge, academic, or informed 
observer--not only agrees that the only goal of the antitrust laws 
should be to promote economic welfare, but also agrees on the 
essential tenets of economic theory that should be used to determine 
the consistency of specific business practices with that goal.72 
 
Despite Posner’s assertion, the U.S. antitrust community never agreed 
that antitrust’s goals were only economic or that antitrust had one goal, to 
promote economic welfare.73  Others continued to recognize antitrust’s 
                                                                                                                            
Antitrust History, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 879, 882-83 (1990); Robert H. Lande, Wealth 
Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation 
Challenged, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 889-94 (1999). 
68
 Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (1982) (collecting articles that antitrust’s overriding goal is economic efficiency). 
69
 BORK, supra note 40, at 91; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW viii-ix 
(2d ed. 2001). 
70
 HOVENKAMP, supra note 66, at 71-73 (summarizing Chicago School’s theories); 
Adams & Brock, supra note 37, at 282-93 (same). 
71
 Markham, supra note 34, at 280.  
72
 POSNER, supra note 69, at ix; see also Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. United States, 
704 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (“The allocative-efficiency or consumer-
welfare concept of competition dominates current thinking, judicial and academic, in the 
antitrust field.”). 
73
 Daniel L. Rubinfeld, On the Foundations of Antitrust Law and Economics, in HOW 
THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC 
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multiple objectives.74  Professors Adams and Brock, for example, identified 
among antitrust’s traditional aims: (i) private economic power, like all 
absolute power, is subject to abuse and injurious to public welfare, (ii) such 
power must be decentralized to protect a free society from its abuse, (iii) 
competitively structured markets diffuse private power and discipline 
economic decision-making, and (iv) antitrust policy is critical to preserve 
competitive markets.75 While the FTC chair during the Clinton 
administration, Professor Robert Pitofsky referred to antitrust’s non-
economic goals.76  As he earlier wrote, “[i]t is bad history, bad policy, and 
bad law to exclude certain political values in interpreting the antitrust laws,” 
and any antitrust policy that excluded such political values “would be 
unresponsive to the will of Congress.”77  
Nor did antitrust lawyers ever agree that antitrust’s sole goal is 
                                                                                                                            
ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 56 (Robert Pitofsky ed. 2008) (noting disagreement within 
antitrust community over “whether economic efficiency should be the sole norm in 
antitrust or whether efficiency should be balanced against other norms such as consumer 
welfare and/or the promotion of small business”). 
74
 See, e.g., DAVIDSON, supra note 52, at 37; Darren Bush, Too Big to Bail:  The Role 
of Antitrust to Distressed Industries, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 277, 281-96 (2010); Spencer 
Weber Waller, Bringing Globalism Home: Lessons from Antitrust and Beyond, 32 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 113, 117 (2000); Eleanor Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust:  A New 
Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1182 (1981) (identifying Sherman Act’s four 
major historical goals as “(1) dispersion of economic power, (2) freedom and opportunity 
to compete on merits, (3) satisfaction of consumers, and (4) protection of competition 
process as market governor”). 
75
 Adams & Brock, supra note 37, at 262-79; see also JOSEPH W. BURNS, A STUDY OF 
THE ANTITRUST LAW: THEIR ADMINISTRATION, INTERPRETATION AND EFFECT 341 (1958) 
(“Concern over excessive growth of private economic power and its social and political 
implications is built into every member of the structure of antitrust policy, including 
section 7.”); Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust 
Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422 (1965). 
76
 Robert Pitofsky, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at 
the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property (June 15, 2000), 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/000615speech.shtm. 
77
 Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051-
52 (1979) (one political value underlying the Sherman Act was a “fear that excessive 
concentration of economic power will breed antidemocratic political pressures”); William 
E. Kovacic, ICN Curriculum Project, Module 1: Origins and Aims of Competition Policy 
(May 2011), http://www.icnblog.org/ftc/ftc-1-module-4-28-11/player.html (discussing 
Sherman Act’s political and economic objectives). 
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promoting Posner’s conception of economic welfare.78  For example, two 
years after Posner’s assertion, the ABA discussed antitrust’s social and 
political objectives.79 
While unsuccessful with Congress,80 the Chicago School influenced the 
Reagan81 and Bush82 administrations and courts.83  The debate over 
antitrust’s goals shifted, although not completely,84 to the economic 
                                                 
78
  See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sherman Act Section 2 Joint 
Hearing: Understanding Single-Firm Behavior--Conduct As Related To Competition (May 
8, 2007), www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/single_firm/docs/225233.wpd-2007-08-29-, 
(Statement of Douglas Melamed) (characterizing hearings as an “unbounded exercise for a 
public policy class at the Kennedy School” with the different views stemming from 
differences in assumptions about antitrust’s purpose). 
79
 ABA, ANTITRUST GOALS, supra note 41. 
80
 Anna Cifelli Isgro, Antitrust Reform: DOA Reagan’s Plan Rankles Business 
Lobbies, Consumer Groups, and Congressman Rodino, FORTUNE, Mar. 31, 1986, 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1986/03/31/67320/index.htm. 
81
 As now Chief Justice John Roberts said at the time, the Reagan administration’s 
“antitrust enforcement activities parallel our general concern with excessive regulation.” 
http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/accession-60-89-0372/ doc004.pdf; William F. 
Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman’s View, 71 CAL. L. REV. 618, 630 
(1983) (announcing that DOJ “will consider only those factors that, according to economic 
theory or empirical evidence, relate to the ease and profitability of collusion. An industry 
trend toward concentration is not a factor that will be considered, even though it has been 
used in the past.”). 
82
 Competition officials during the last Bush administration stated that the “promotion 
of consumer welfare and the organization of the free market economy are the only goals of 
its antitrust laws . . . with other economic or social objectives better pursued by other 
instruments.” Unilateral Conduct Working Grp., Int’l Competition Network, Report on the 
Objectives of Unilateral Conduct Laws, Assessment of Dominance/Substantial Market 
Power, and State-Created Monopolies 31 (2007), 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc353.pdf [hereinafter 
2007 ICN Report]. 
83
 Markham, supra note 34, at 264-65 (“Beginning with Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania, Inc., the antitrust laws in the United States began a steady process of judicial 
erosion to eliminate multiple and possibly conflicting policy objectives, distilling in their 
place the exclusive purpose of promoting consumer welfare through allocative and 
dynamic efficiency.”). 
84
 See, e.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 360 (1990) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing that “Court, in its haste to excuse illegal behavior in the 
name of efficiency, has cast aside a century of understanding that our antitrust laws are 
designed to safeguard more than efficiency and consumer welfare, and that private actions 
not only compensate the injured, but also deter wrongdoers.”); LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 
F.3d 141, 169 (3d Cir. 2003) (describing Section 2’s goal, to curb the excesses of 
monopolists and near-monopolists, as “the equivalent in our economic sphere of the 
guarantees of free and unhampered elections in the political sphere. Just as democracy can 
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sphere.85  The primary policy debate was whether to apply a total or 
consumer welfare standard.86  Likewise, in the past policy cycle, the Court 
acknowledged antitrust’s economic goals, but not its political, social and 
moral goals.87  For example, the Court recently praised monopoly prices as 
an inducement for innovation.88  One district court, following the Court’s 
dictum, went further afield in announcing, “the purpose of antitrust laws is 
not to prevent monopolies.”89  This, of course, is squarely inconsistent with 
the Clayton Act, which prohibits practices and mergers “that tend to create a 
                                                                                                                            
thrive only in a free political system unhindered by outside forces, so also can market 
capitalism survive only if those with market power are kept in check.”); MCI Commc’ns 
Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1176 (7th Cir. 1983) (Wood, C.J., concurring 
& dissenting in part) (“While efficiency and consumer welfare are laudable goals, they 
should not be permitted to entirely eclipse a major aim of the antitrust laws: the promotion 
of competition. To advance efficiency ahead of competition in the hierarchy of antitrust 
values is to slight the non-economic dimension of the Sherman Act’s concern with 
competition.”). 
85
 Michael A. Carrier, Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite 
Innovation, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1062 (2003) (noting in the past generation courts have 
emphasized economic efficiencies to the exclusion of noneconomic objectives); Rudolph 
J.R. Peritz, Foreword, Antitrust as Public Interest Law, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 767, 771-
72 (1991) (traditional goals such as “the abatement of unfair competition, a strong 
preference for individual entrepreneurs, the disfavor of monopoly profits, a distrust of firms 
with great economic power, and a recognition of competition as a process with social, 
economic, and political returns” were “shoved into the archives of antitrust history”). 
86
 See, e.g., John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of 
Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 
208 (2008) (arguing that Congress’s overriding concern was with protecting purchasers 
from paying supracompetitive prices, and antitrust policy can and should take business 
welfare into account in those few situations that help businesses but do not cause 
consumers to pay supracompetitive prices); Dennis W. Carlton, Econ. Analysis Grp. 
Discussion Paper, Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?, EAG 07-3 (Jan. 2007), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/eag/221242.htm (describing the debate as maximizing 
consumer surplus, total surplus (total welfare), or some weighted average of producer plus 
consumer surplus, and arguing that the proper objective of antitrust should be total, not 
consumer, surplus); Russell Pittman, Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for 
Antitrust Enforcement, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 205, 206 (2007) (discussing debate 
among senior DOJ’s Antitrust Division economists over a total versus consumer surplus 
standard). 
87
 See supra note 57. 
88
 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 
(2004). 
89
 Edgenet, Inc. v. GS1 AISBL, 742 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1034 (E.D. Wis. 2010) motion to 
certify appeal denied, 09-CV-65, 2011 WL 1305219 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 1, 2011). 
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monopoly.”90  But it shows how far some courts have strayed from 
antitrust’s historical goals. 
D.  ICN Members’ Multiple Goals 
While the U.S. during the past policy cycle sought a single economic 
goal for antitrust, elsewhere more countries were enacting competition laws, 
with more antitrust objectives as a result.  The ICN recently completed three 
surveys of its member competition authorities to identify their countries’ 
antitrust objectives.  As the ICN found, the “objectives of competition laws 
vary widely from one jurisdiction to another. . . . [P]arallel objectives, 
possibly conflicting with that of economic efficiency or consumer welfare, 
are present in many competition laws.”91   
The ICN in its first survey asked about the countries’ objectives 
regarding laws prohibiting monopolistic behavior.  Ten objectives emerged: 
       • Ensuring an effective competitive process, 
       • Promoting consumer welfare, 
       • Enhancing efficiency, 
       • Ensuring economic freedom, 
       • Ensuring a level playing field for small and mid-sized enterprises, 
       • Promoting fairness and equality, 
       • Promoting consumer choice, 
       • Achieving market integration, 
       • Facilitating privatization and market liberalization, and 
       • Promoting competitiveness in international markets.92 
In the second survey of 33 jurisdictions, the main antitrust objectives 
were the promotion of competition, economic efficiency, and increasing 
                                                 
90
 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-14, 18. 
91
 Advocacy Working Grp., Int’l Competition Network, Advocacy and Competition 
Policy Report 32 (2002), http:// 
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/OutreachToolkit/media/assets/resources/advoca
cy_ report.pdf [hereinafter ICN Advocacy Report]. 
92
 2007 ICN Report, supra note 82, at annex A. 
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consumer welfare.93  Included within these terms were other goals such as 
guaranteeing “equal conditions for all enterprises in the market.”94 
The third survey in 2011 explored 57 countries’ conception and 
application of one oft-cited goal, promoting consumer welfare.95 
Consequently, the reality facing international firms today is various 
policy goals.  Antitrust goals that prevail in one jurisdiction are not 
necessarily as important in other jurisdictions.  
II. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT GOALS TO UNIFY ANTITRUST POLICY 
As Part I discusses, U.S. antitrust policy in the United States historically 
recognized multiple goals.  In the last policy cycle, however, some sought 
to limit antitrust to a single economic goal.  This Part examines why four 
oft-cited economic goals neither unified antitrust policy nor significantly 
improved antitrust analysis.96 
A.  Why Ensuring an Effective Competitive Process Never Unified Antitrust 
Policy 
The U.S. courts have remarked that the “purpose of antitrust law, at 
least as articulated in the modern cases, is to protect the competitive 
process.”97  Similarly all but one of the competition agencies surveyed by 
the ICN cited “[e]nsuring an effective competitive process” as an objective 
of the monopolization laws.98 Presumably, no one advocates an 
“ineffective” competitive process. 
This goal fails, as it simply shifts the debate to the larger, unresolved 
                                                 
93
 Turkish Competition Auth., International Competition Network Report on Interface 
between Competition Policy and Other Public Policies 44 (Apr. 2010), http://www.icn-
istanbul.org/Upload/Materials/SpecialProject/SP_BackgroundReport.pdf. 
94
 2011 ICN Survey, supra note 47, at 7 (identifying one of Barbados’s primary 
objectives). 
95
 Id. 
96
 Richard D. Cudahy & Alan Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95 MINN. L. REV. 59, 60-
61 (2010); Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 17, at 1421-73. 
97
 Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1437 (7th Cir.1986); see also Tal v. 
Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (same); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 
36 F.3d 958, 963 (10th Cir. 1994) (same). 
98
 2007 ICN Report, supra note 82, at 6. 
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issue, namely defining an “effective competitive process.”99  No consensus 
exists in the United States or worldwide on an effective competition process 
or on a unifying theory of competition.100  Antitrust becomes a tautology.  
The goal of competition law is “promoting competition by discouraging 
anti-competitive behaviour.”101  
What constitutes an effective competitive process varies by audience.102 
Among the goals cited by the ICN-surveyed agencies were protecting 
consumers,103 encouraging creativity in business activities,104 achieving 
efficiency and fairness to small and medium-sized enterprises,105 and 
safeguarding jobs.106  Entrenched firms may emphasize promoting their 
freedom to contract, choose their distributors or retailers, and not deal with 
their competitors.  Domestic competitors may advocate protecting choice 
for consumers to insulate themselves from more efficient international 
competitors.107  Entrepreneurs may emphasize greater access to the 
                                                 
99
 Id. at 8 (noting Chilean Competition Tribunal’s response “that while the only 
objective of competition policy is to promote and protect competition, one of the main 
difficulties is to define legally what ‘free competition means,’ or to articulate why 
competition itself should be protected”). 
100
 Stucke, Reconsidering Competition, supra note 39 (discussing how any theory of 
competition depends on its assumptions, the validity of which can vary across industries 
and time); Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Policy Brief:  What Is Competition on the 
Merits? 1 (2006), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/27/37082099.pdf (noting term 
“competition on the merits” has “never been satisfactorily defined,” which has “led to a 
discordant body of case law that uses an assortment of analytical methods,” which in turn 
has “produced unpredictable results and undermined the term’s legitimacy along with 
policies that are supposedly based on it”). 
101
 CUTS Centre for Competition, Inv. & Econ. Regulation, Towards a Healthy 
Competition Culture... i (2003), http://www.cuts-international.org/THC.pdf [hereinafter 
CUTS]. 
102
 Id. 
103
 2007 ICN Report, supra note 82, at 7. 
104
 Id.  
105
 Id.  
106
 Id.  
107
 For example, certain developing nations noted that transnational companies “enjoy 
advantages over domestic firms because of their size, reach and control over intellectual 
property (technologies, brands, copyright etc).” CUTS, supra note 101, at 17. One 
necessity of competition policy, as envisioned by CUTS, is “to prevent these firms from 
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marketplace.  Consumers may want it all: lower prices, greater choices, 
better quality, more innovation, while preserving their jobs and pay 
structure at domestic firms. 
Nor can policymakers define an “effective competitive process” by the 
desired effects, such as lower costs and prices, improved quality and 
services, greater choice, and more innovation.  The desired competitive 
effects can conflict.  The Court, for example, stresses the importance of 
price competition.108  Yet the Court recently accepted higher prices (and 
diminished intra-brand competition) for more services (and potentially more 
inter-brand competition).109  Higher prices at times are needed for 
innovation.110 
Accordingly, the objective of an effective competitive process is simply 
                                                                                                                            
unfairly exploiting these advantages.”  Id.  
108
 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 
107-08 (1984) (restraint “that has the effect of reducing the importance of consumer 
preference in setting price and output is not consistent with this fundamental goal of 
antitrust law” and restrictions on “price and output are the paradigmatic examples of 
restraints of trade that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit”); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. 
linkLine Communc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1120 (2009) (“Low prices 
benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as they are above 
predatory levels, they do not threaten competition.”) (quotation omitted); see also Cascade 
Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 896 (9th Cir. 2008) (“price cutting is a 
practice the antitrust laws aim to promote”); Wallace v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 467 
F.3d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 2006) (“goal of antitrust law is to use rivalry to keep prices low 
for consumers’ benefit.  Employing antitrust law to drive prices up would turn the Sherman 
Act on its head.”); Animal Sci. Products, Inc. v. China Nat’l Metals & Minerals Imp. & 
Exp. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 320, 465 (D.N.J. 2010) (“goal of antitrust law is to create the 
maximum market competition between the sellers of the same goods and, hence, to drive 
the price on these goods as much down as possible”). 
109
 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 895-96 (2007); 
Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1339 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Higher prices 
alone are not the ‘epitome’ of anticompetitive harm . . . Rather, consumer welfare, 
understood in the sense of allocative efficiency, is the animating concern of the Sherman 
Act.”). 
110
 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 215-16 (2003) (need to balance encouraging 
innovation by rewarding inventors with the right to exclude others for a limited time from 
using the patented invention with the “avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition 
without any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”). 
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a belief in other objectives, which can conflict.111 
B.  Why Consumer Welfare Never Unified Antitrust Policy 
In the past antitrust policy cycle, the U.S. courts increasingly identified 
consumer welfare as a historic antitrust concern.112  The irony is that before 
1975, the Court never mentioned “consumer welfare” in an antitrust case.113 
Despite its pleasant democratic ring (who, after all, advocates hindering 
consumer welfare?), it too suffers infirmities. 
1. No Consensus Exists on What Consumer Welfare Actually Means  
In 1987, Professor Joseph Brodley remarked that the terms efficiency 
and consumer welfare “have become the dominant terms of antitrust 
discourse without any clear consensus as to what they exactly mean” and 
that consumer welfare “is the most abused term in modern analysis.”114  
That remains true today.115 
                                                 
111
 CUTS, supra note 101, at i. 
112
 See supra note 87.  
113
 United States v. Citizens & S. Nat. Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 132 n.1 (1975) 
(“Correspondent banking, like other intra-industry interaction among firms or their top 
management, provides an opportunity both for the kind of education and sharing of 
expertise that ultimately enhances consumer welfare and for ‘understandings’ that inhibit, 
if not foreclose, the rivalry that antitrust laws seek to promote.”). The term consumer 
welfare appeared more frequently in books during the past antitrust policy cycle: 
 
Google Books Ngram Viewer, http://ngrams.googlelabs.com. 
114
 Joseph Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust:  Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, 
and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1032 (1987). 
115
 HOVENKAMP, supra note 66, at 85 (noting term’s ambiguity); Barak Y. Orbach, The 
Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox 2, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133, 134 (2011) 
(“academic confusion and thoughtless judicial borrowing led to the rise of a label 
[consumer welfare] that thirty years later has no clear meaning”); Steven C. Salop, 
Question: What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard?  Answer: The True 
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Although thirty of thirty-three countries in the 2007 ICN survey 
identified this objective, most did “not specifically define consumer welfare 
and appear[ed] to have different economic understandings of the term.”116  
Similarly the 2011 survey, while finding “some agreement” among the 
surveyed 57 competition authorities, identified significant differences.117  
Only 7 of the 57 agreed with the provided definition of consumer 
welfare.118  Most (38 of the 57) antitrust authorities had “no explicit 
definition” of consumer welfare.119  Some considered consumer welfare as 
“a natural result of enforcement activities but not necessarily an underlying 
goal.”120  Under this definition, antitrust enforcers promote consumer 
welfare whenever they act (or not act).  Others defined consumer welfare 
broadly to include “safeguarding the competitive process,” which in turn 
encompasses both price and non-price dimensions.121  France included 
“enhancing the competitive process . . . stimulating an efficient allocation of 
resources and preventing unchecked market power” within its conception of 
promoting consumer welfare over the long-term.122   
Not only do competition authorities disagree over the term’s meaning. 
The U.S. Antitrust Modernization Commissioners, after three years, could 
                                                                                                                            
Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 347 (2010) (noting 
confusion over meaning of aggregate and consumer welfare standards); J. Thomas Rosch, 
Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Next Challenges for Antitrust Economists, Remarks at 
the NERA 2010 Antitrust & Trade Regulation Seminar (July 8, 2010) (noting many 
different ideas exist as to how to promote consumer welfare), 
www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100708neraspeech.pdf.  
116
 2007 ICN Report, supra note 82, at 9. 
117
 2011 ICN Survey, supra note 47, at 4-6.  
118
 Id. at 18 nn. 34-35 (consumer welfare “relates only to consumer surplus” and 
excludes “non-economic considerations”). 
119
 Id. at 18-19. 
120
 Id. at 10. 
121
 Compare id. at 10 with id. at 11, 12 (countries separately identifying other goals, 
such as maintaining effective competition, as distinct from consumer welfare). 
122
 Id. at 10; Elzinga, supra note 48, at 1193 (discussing how efficiency and equity 
were not mutually exclusive, and included the distribution of income). 
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not reach unanimity on the term.123  The Commissioners issued in 2007 
their 449-page report on how “antitrust law and enforcement can best serve 
consumer welfare in the global, high-tech economy that exists today.”124  
But the debate before and within the AMC was “about the precise definition 
of ‘consumer welfare.”’125 The “[d]ebate continues over whether the 
Supreme Court implicitly adopted the goal of allocative efficiency or the 
goal of preventing wealth transfers as the standard by which consumer 
welfare should be measured.”126  
Consequently, consumer welfare means different things to different 
people.  As the economist F.A. Hayek observed, the welfare of a people 
“cannot be adequately expressed as a single end, but only as a hierarchy of 
ends, a comprehensive scale of values in which every need of every person 
is given its place.”127  Consumer welfare is not a well-defined goal but a 
generality that incorporates different social, political, economic, and moral 
values.  Bork’s definition of consumer welfare differs from other scholars’ 
definitions.128 For Judge Wald and others, the phrase consumer welfare 
“surely includes far more than simple economic efficiency.”129  Professors 
Sullivan and Grimes discuss within the definition of consumer welfare 
maintaining allocative efficiency, preventing wealth transfers, and 
                                                 
123
 The Antitrust Modernization Commission was created pursuant to the Antitrust 
Modernization Commission Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, §§ 11051-60, 116 Stat. 
1856.   
124
 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2007), 
available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf 
[hereinafter AMC REPORT]. 
125
 Id. at 26 n.22. 
126
 Id. at 43 n.19. 
127
 HAYEK, supra note 50, at 101.  
128
 Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. L. & 
ECON. 7, 7-48 (1966); Lande, Wealth Transfers, supra note 67, at 65-151; Robert H. 
Lande, Proving the Obvious: The Antitrust Laws Were Passed to Protect Consumers (not 
Just to Increase Efficiency), 50 HASTINGS L.J. 959, 963-66 (1999). 
129
 Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 231 n.3 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986) (Wald, J., concurring). 
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preserving consumer choice.130 Not surprisingly, courts have reached 
inconsistent results, based on their conception of consumer welfare.131 
2. Difficulty in Identifying the Consumer 
If antitrust’s goal is promoting consumer welfare, another dispute is 
defining the consumer.  If the consumer is anyone who uses economic 
goods,132 or “refers to all direct and indirect users who are affected by the 
anticompetitive agreements, behavior or mergers in question,”133 then 
everyone—from the poorest individual to the wealthiest corporate 
monopoly--is a consumer.  The consumer welfare standard becomes a total 
welfare standard, which raises separate concerns over the distribution of 
wealth.134  If the consumer includes poor individuals but excludes wealthy 
monopolies (and other corporate purchasers of goods and services), then the 
definition becomes more political and subjective.135 
3. Operational Difficulties 
Some U.S. courts say that the “reduction of competition does not invoke 
the Sherman Act until it harms consumer welfare.”136  This is nonsense. 
                                                 
130
 LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN 
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 12-16 (2d ed. 2006). 
131
 Compare Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1033-34 (N.D. Cal. 
2001) (antitrust laws are concerned with consumer welfare and not with competitors 
seeking to obtain monopoly) with Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 536 (7th Cir. 
1986) (Sherman Act protects rivalry to obtain monopoly). 
132
 WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 242 (1979) (defining consumer). 
133
 2011 ICN Survey, supra note 47, at 32. 
134
 Id. at 27. 
135
 Id. at 32; Carlton, supra note 86 (“if only consumers matter, then a buying cartel 
should be perfectly legal and indeed should be encouraged” and “the notion that antitrust 
should focus on consumers, not firms, is premised on a false vision of who are consumers 
and who are firms. Most transactions in our economy are between firms.”). 
136
 Metro Indus., Inc. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839, 848 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Rebel 
Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995)); Templin v. Times 
Mirror Cable Television, Inc., 56 F.3d 73 (9th Cir. 1995); Ice Cream Distribs. of 
Evansville, LLC v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., 09-5815 CW, 2010 WL 3619884 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2010); J. Allen Ramey, M.D., Inc. v. Pac. Found. For Med. Care, 999 
F. Supp. 1355, 1364 (S.D. Cal. 1998); Kinderstart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., C06-
2057JFRS, 2007 WL 831806 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007); Streamcast Networks, Inc. v. 
Skype Technologies, S.A., 547 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Fox v. Good 
Samaritan Hosp., C-04-00874RMW, 2007 WL 2938175 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2007); Perry v. 
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Courts have not arrived at a shared, specific definition of consumer welfare.  
Even if they did, courts cannot value, consistent with the rule of law, how 
much competition can be reduced before harming consumer welfare.   
One rule-of-law concern is that quantifying consumer welfare is itself 
impracticable, if not impossible.  Twenty-eight percent of the countries in 
the 2011 ICN survey believed that quantifying consumer harm was “not 
possible.”137  Of those who believed it possible to quantify detriment to 
consumer welfare, they all recognized difficulties and limitations to such 
quantification.138  Thus, requiring an antitrust plaintiff to show when a 
reduction in competition harms consumer welfare is illogical when “no 
easy, non-contestable, method for quantifying harm to consumer welfare” 
currently exists.139  
A second rule-of-law concern is the constraints on data availability to 
undertake this review.  Suppose, for example, courts adopted as their 
definition of consumer welfare “the individual benefits derived from the 
consumption of goods and services.”140  Under this definition, “individual 
welfare is defined by an individual’s own assessment of his/her satisfaction, 
given prices and income;” accordingly, measuring consumer welfare 
“requires information about individual preferences.”141  Measuring 
individual preferences is itself difficult.  One cannot rely entirely on 
consumers’ choices, as consumers at times choose poorly and contrary to 
their long-term interests.142  Moreover, consumer welfare, if measured on 
                                                                                                                            
Rado, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1047 (E.D. Wash. 2007), aff’d, 343 F. App’x. 240 (9th Cir. 
2009).  
137
 2011 ICN Survey, supra note 47, at 40. 
138
 Id. at 41. 
139
 Id. at 88. 
140
 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., GLOSSARY OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANISATION ECONOMICS AND COMPETITION LAW 29 (1993), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/61/2376087.pdf [hereinafter OECD GLOSSARY].  
141
 Id. 
142
 See, e.g., Simona Botti & Sheena S. Iyengar, The Dark Side of Choice: When 
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the individual level, does not address restraints and mergers that increase 
some consumers’ welfare, while decreasing others’.  
Some economists adopt consumers’ surplus143 to measure consumer 
welfare.144  But consumer surplus is seen as synonymous with static price 
competition, which is of limited use in industries with dynamic 
competition.145  Thus, the ICN surveyed countries generally did “not seem 
to wish to be tied to a formal definition of consumer welfare as consumer 
surplus, and certainly not if consumer surplus is given a narrow definition 
and confined to price, without due consideration for quality, and other 
economic criteria.”146  Plus, “there is considerable debate over the degree to 
which [surplus] corresponds to more theoretically appealing measures of 
consumer welfare.”147  Ultimately proving that consumers were harmed 
often involves significant labor, time, and other costs and the data is not 
always available.148 
A third rule-of-law concern is predictability and objectivity.  Taking the 
mantra that the “antitrust law aims to protect competition, not competitors,” 
courts begin their analysis of antitrust injury “from the viewpoint of the 
consumer.”149 A “prototypical example of antitrust injury” is that 
                                                                                                                            
Choice Impairs Social Welfare, 25 J. PUBLIC POL’Y & MARKETING 24, 26 (2006). 
143
 Consumer surplus is the “excess of social valuation of product over the price 
actually paid,” and “is measured by the area of a triangle below a demand curve and above 
the observed price.” OECD GLOSSARY, supra note 140, at 28.  Suppose for example, after 
a long hike, you were willing to pay $2 for a cold Diet Coke.  At the local store, you paid 
50 cents.  Your consumer surplus was $1.50.  What consumers are willing to pay (and the 
amount of consumer surplus) can fluctuate, such as the price one is willing to pay for an 
umbrella. 
144
 2011 ICN Survey, supra note 47, at 18 (7 of the 57 survey countries). 
145
 Id. at 19. 
146
 Id. at 26. 
147
 OECD GLOSSARY, supra note 140, at 28; see also Orbach, supra note 115, at 20-
27.  
148
 2011 ICN Survey, supra note 47, at 45. 
149
 Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 641 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting Alberta 
Gas Chemicals, Ltd. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 826 F.2d 1235, 1240 (3d 
Cir.1987)). 
30 RECONSIDERING ANTITRUST’S GOALS [11-Aug-11 
consumers “had to pay higher prices (or experienced a reduction in the 
quality of service) as a result of a defendant's anticompetitive conduct.”150  
This standard is feasible when defendants illegally fixed the price of 
consumer goods or services.  But proving this kind of antitrust injury in 
many other antitrust cases, such as when an entrenched firm eliminates a 
start-up through exclusionary means, is harder.  Nor can an antitrust 
plaintiff prove her consumer welfare was reduced; instead he “must prove 
that the challenged conduct affected the prices, quantity or quality of goods 
or services and not just his own welfare.”151 As a circuit court judge and his 
co-author observed, it requires the antitrust plaintiff to engage in a 
“speculative, possibly labyrinthine, and unnecessary” analysis of how the 
restraints’ efficiencies and inefficiencies affect the ill-defined consumer.152 
This analysis, as the ICN found, engenders “a relatively high degree of 
uncertainty in estimations or assumptions used for quantification of 
detriment to consumer welfare.”153 
Some courts equate a reduction of consumer welfare with an increase in 
price or reduction in quality.154  This, however, says nothing about other 
important facets of competition (such as variety or innovation).  One district 
court under its narrow conception of consumer welfare, for example, 
dismissed an antitrust complaint, in part because “reduced innovation as a 
result of defendants’ conduct does not create an inference of raised 
consumer prices or reduced output.”155 These courts cannot simply assume 
                                                 
150
 Mathias v. Daily News, L.P., 152 F. Supp. 2d 465, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
151
 Ginzburg v. Mem’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 998, 1015 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 
152
 Cudahy & Devlin, supra note 96, at 87. 
153
 2011 ICN Survey, supra note 47, at 43. 
154
 Pool Water Products v. Olin Corp., 258 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“Consumer welfare is maximized when economic resources are allocated to their best use 
and when consumers are assured competitive price and quality.”) (quoting Rebel Oil Co. v. 
Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
155
 Edgenet, Inc. v. GS1 AISBL, 742 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1013 (E.D. Wis. 2010) motion 
to certify appeal denied, 09-CV-65, 2011 WL 1305219 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 1, 2011). 
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that because prices did not increase and output did not decrease as a result 
of the restraint, consumer welfare was not diminished.156  One cannot 
assume that generalist courts can determine “how much restraint of 
competition is in the public interest”; such a “shifting, vague, and 
indeterminate” standard would put courts into “sea of doubt.”157 
Consequently, consumer welfare provides little guidance as an antitrust 
goal.  While some courts, particularly those in the Ninth Circuit, require a 
showing that the restraint adversely impacts consumer welfare, this cannot 
be taken literally.  The “connection between consumer welfare and the 
practical enforcement of competition law is not always straightforward,” 
concluded the 2011 ICN survey; “there may be a considerable gap between 
policy statements and practice.”158  Consumer welfare for some agencies 
“provides general, underlying conceptual guidance rather than a technical 
test for enforcement in practice.”159 Although consumer welfare over the 
past thirty years is frequently mentioned as a policy goal, there remains no 
consensus on what the term actually means or who the consumers are.  Plus, 
under any of the current definitions, there remains “no easy, non-
contestable method for quantifying harm to consumer welfare that will 
work for all cases.”160 
C.  Why Enhancing Efficiency Never Unified Antitrust Policy 
Courts have cited enhancing efficiency as an antitrust goal.161  But the 
                                                 
156
 2011 ICN Survey, supra note 47, at 44. 
157
 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F. 271, 283-84 (6th Cir. 1898). 
158
 Id. at 3. 
159
 Id. at 19. 
160
 Id. at 45. 
161
 See, e.g., Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 
U.S. 284, 289-90 (1985) (whether to apply Court’s per se illegal rule turns on “whether the 
practice facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict 
competition and decrease output . . . or instead one designed to ‘increase economic 
efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive’”) (quoting Broad. Music, 
Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)).   
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legal status of efficiencies as antitrust’s primary goal is weaker.162  
Although the Supreme Court has not sanctioned the use of the efficiencies 
defense in merger cases, the trend among lower courts is to recognize the 
defense.163  Enhancing efficiency ranked third in the ICN survey (20 of the 
33 competition authorities citing goal).164  It too has a pleasant ring. (After 
all, who advocates promoting inefficiency?)  It too suffers infirmities. 
1. The Term Efficiency Is Not Self-Defining, But Encompasses Different 
Concepts 
As the ICN noted, “[e]fficiency is a broad economic term that may refer 
to allocative efficiency (allocation of resources to their most efficient use), 
productive efficiency (production in the least costly way), or dynamic 
efficiency (rate of introduction of new products or improvements of 
products and production techniques).”165  
Many of the surveyed competition agencies did not specify which 
efficiencies were their goals.166  Indeed some efficiencies (dynamic) can be 
more important than others (productive).167  What is important for our 
purposes is that an antitrust policy that focuses on maximizing one type of 
efficiency (e.g., productive) will not necessarily maximize other efficiencies 
(e.g., dynamic).168 
                                                 
162
 F.T.C. v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1088 (D.D.C. 1997) (noting efficiency 
defense--whereby merging parties can defend merger by showing its creating significant 
efficiencies in the relevant market, thereby offsetting any anti-competitive effects--“not 
entirely clear” as a legal matter); see also John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The 
Chicago School’s Foundation is Flawed:  Antitrust Protects Consumers, Not Efficiency, in 
HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 73, at 93-94. 
163
 F.T.C. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  No court to date has 
permitted a merger based on an efficiencies defense. 
164
 2007 ICN Report, supra note 82, at 12. 
165
 Id. 
166
 Id. 
167
 Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Policy Roundtables: Dynamic Efficiencies in 
Merger Analysis 10 (May 22, 2007), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/22/40623561.pdf 
[hereinafter OECD Dynamic Efficiencies]. 
168
 William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust 
Div., What Is Competition?, Seminar on Convergence Sponsored by the Netherlands 
Ministry of Economic Affairs (Oct. 28, 2002), 
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2. Difficulties in Measuring Efficiency 
As Professor Brodley observes, “[p]ractical difficulties of courtroom 
proof severely limit implementation of efficiency goals, however 
important.”169  Ideally if maximizing efficiency were the goal, the 
competition authority would calculate accurately the net present value of 
each efficiency (e.g., value of new technologies) and inefficiency (e.g., 
disincentives to innovate post-merger, increase in waste) from the merger, 
and the likely efficiencies/inefficiencies if the merger were prohibited.  The 
problem (especially in dynamic industries) is one cannot accurately 
calculate with the current economic tools the merger’s impact on allocative, 
productive, and dynamic efficiencies.  Although the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines are an improvement in incorporating non-price dimensions on 
competition, the new Guidelines, as FTC Commissioner Rosch observed, 
still lack a clear framework for analyzing a merger’s impact on innovation, 
variety, and other non-price competition.170 
a. Difficulties in Measuring Allocative Efficiency 
Courts, in particular the Ninth Circuit, state that “an act is deemed 
anticompetitive under the Sherman Act only when it harms both allocative 
efficiency and raises the prices of goods above competitive levels or 
diminishes their quality.”171  The first problem, which these courts never 
address, is that the term allocative efficiency has different meanings.172  
The Ninth Circuit appears to define allocative efficiency as to “when 
economic resources are allocated to their best use.”173  Its definition of 
                                                                                                                            
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/200440.htm. 
169
 Brodley, supra note 114, at 1028. 
170
 Rosch, Next Challenges, supra note 115, at 7.  
171
 Hilton v. Children’s Hosp. San Diego, 315 F. App’x. 607, 609 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995). 
172
 HOVENKAMP, supra note 66, at 83 (calling allocative efficiency a “more theoretical 
and controversial concept” with “different economists and philosophers prefer[ing] 
different definitions”). 
173
 Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1433. 
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allocative efficiency can be construed as perfect price discrimination:  Each 
consumer pays the highest price she is willing to pay (her reservation price), 
and there is no deadweight welfare loss.174  While acceptable for some 
economists, others find this price discrimination (and paying higher prices) 
as unfair.175  Another problem is that price discrimination, with several 
exceptions, is illegal.176 
Another definition of allocative efficiency is Pareto efficiency, whereby 
“resources are so allocated that it is not possible to make anyone better off 
without making someone else worse off.”177  But this definition cannot 
serve as the policy goal.  As Posner observed, Pareto efficiency “has few 
applications to the real world.”178  Many mergers make someone worse off:  
competitors (by making the merged entity more efficient), suppliers and 
distributors (by eliminating them or making the terms less favorable), and 
customers (higher prices, reduced variety, less innovation).179 
Some view allocative efficiency as “leading firms to produce output up 
to the point where the marginal cost of each unit just equals the value of that 
                                                 
174
 Cudahy & Devlin, supra note 96, at 92. 
175
 Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in 
the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 735 (1986) (91% of individuals surveyed thought 
charging higher prices to those more dependent on the product was offensive) [hereinafter 
Fairness]. 
176
 Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 554-56 (1990) (discussing when price 
discrimination between a wholesaler and retailer violates the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 13(a)). 
177
 OECD GLOSSARY, supra note 140, at 65. 
178
 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13 (7th ed. 2007). 
179
 Likewise potential Pareto superiority fails on two levels: trying to assess how the 
merger would affect the welfare of individuals and firms not before the court is beyond the 
district court’s capabilities, and “Kaldor compensation principle works as a one off shot, 
but fails in situations where multiple detriments occur to the same group of people.”  PHIL 
EVANS, IN SEARCH OF THE MARGINAL CONSUMER: THE FIPRA STUDY 18 (2008); Wolfgang 
Kerber, Should Competition Law Promote Efficiency? Some Reflections of an Economist 
on the Normative Foundations of Competition Law, in ECONOMIC THEORY AND 
COMPETITION LAW (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2009) (discussing criticisms of Kaldor-Hicks as 
normative criterion for economic analysis of legal rules when gains and losses are 
distributed unevenly among population). 
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unit to consumers.”180  This has, at least, two problems.  First, a product’s 
marginal cost, courts have recognized, “is notoriously difficult to measure 
and ‘cannot be determined from conventional accounting methods.’”181 
Second, reducing price to marginal cost is not always desirable.  Many 
branded products (from your morning coffee to evening cocktail) are priced 
above marginal cost and enjoy some market power.182  So an antitrust goal 
of promoting marginal cost pricing conceivably would justify restricting 
advertising, marketing, and product differentiation, which are at times 
useful.  Also pricing at marginal cost leaves little room for companies to 
invest in innovation.183 “As Joseph Schumpeter first taught us,” a former 
DOJ official said, “productive and dynamic efficiencies are at least as 
important as static allocative efficiency in promoting economic growth.”184 
To simplify further, courts can assess whether the restraint will diminish 
allocative efficiency in that the price will rise above the competitive level or 
quality, service, variety or innovation will diminish.  But, as discussed 
above,185 predicting a merger’s impact on price and non-price competition 
                                                 
180
 William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration 
of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 208 
(2003). 
181
 United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1116 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Ne. 
Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 1981); Pac. Eng’g & Prod. Co. of 
Nev. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 797 (10th Cir. 1977)).  Because marginal cost 
cannot be determined from conventional accounting methods, courts in predatory pricing 
litigation use average variable cost as a surrogate.  Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 
1358 (9th Cir. 1976) (predatory pricing “could be shown by evidence that Shell was selling 
its gasoline at below marginal cost or, because marginal cost is often impossible to 
ascertain, below average variable costs”).  But one criticism is that average variable cost is 
a “poor surrogate.”  HOVENKAMP, supra note 66, at 373. 
182
 Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands, Competition, and the Law, 2010 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1425, 1464. 
183
 2011 ICN Survey, supra note 47, at 30 (Australia noting how antitrust must account 
firms’ earning sufficient returns to invest and innovate). 
184
 William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust 
Div., Comparative Merger Control Analysis: Six Guiding Principles for Antitrust 
Agencies—New and Old (Mar. 18, 2002), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/10845.htm#N_5_. 
185
 See supra II.B.3. 
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is often difficult. 
b. Difficulties in Measuring Productive Efficiencies  
As the antitrust agencies recognize, a merger’s likely productive 
efficiencies “are difficult to verify and quantify, in part because much of the 
information relating to efficiencies is uniquely in the possession of the 
merging firms.”186  
As the agencies found, “efficiencies projected reasonably and in good 
faith by the merging firms may not be realized.”187  Indeed many mergers 
failed to deliver the promised efficiencies.188  Among the well-known biases 
and heuristics relevant to the decision to enter in mergers and acquisitions, 
which frequently result in value destroying transactions, are “myopia, loss 
aversion, endowment effects, status quo bias, extremeness aversion, over-
optimism, hindsight bias, anchoring heuristics, availability heuristics, 
framing effects, representative bias, saliency effects, and others.”189  
Executives in behavioral studies were overconfident in their ability to 
manage a company, systematically underestimated their competitors’ 
strength, and were prone to self-serving interpretations of reality (e.g., 
taking credit for positive outcomes and blaming the environment for 
                                                 
186
  U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines  10 
(Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html; Org. for 
Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Policy Brief: Mergers and Dynamic Efficiencies 1 (Sept. 
2008) (“even in a static analysis, determining whether a merger is likely to lead to 
efficiencies and how they will compare with any anti-competitive effects the merger is 
expected to cause is quite difficult), www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/48/41359037.pdf 
[hereinafter OECD Policy Brief]. 
187
 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 186, at  10. 
188
 DAVIDSON, supra note 52, at 64; Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance 
and Competition Policy, Loyola University Chicago School of Law Research Paper No. 
2011-006, at 48 (Sept. 23, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1681673 
(examining evidence from corporate finance that suggests entire categories of mergers are 
more likely to destroy, rather than enhance, shareholder value); Clayton M. Christensen et 
al., The Big Idea: The New M&A Playbook, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2011, at 49 (“study 
after study puts the failure rate of mergers and acquisitions somewhere between 70% and 
90%”); Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Antitrust and Efficiency: A Comment, 62 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1116, 1117 n.8 (1987) (collecting earlier studies) [hereinafter Comment]. 
189
 Waller, Corporate Governance, supra note 188, at 48. 
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negative outcomes).190  Not only do many mergers fail to yield significant 
efficiencies, the merger process itself, while benefitting investment bankers, 
antitrust lawyers, and economic experts, can misallocate resources and 
divert managerial talent “from creating things of real value.”191  
Consequently, as one roundtable of competition authorities found, 
“[m]aking a prospective determination about whether a merger will lead to 
static efficiencies and how such efficiencies measure up against any anti-
competitive effects that the merger is expected to cause can be very 
challenging.”192  Given these challenges, agency lawyers and economists 
can differ over whether the merging parties verified the efficiencies defense 
to otherwise problematic mergers.193 
Finally, allowing mergers to yield productive efficiencies can lessen 
dynamic efficiency and endanger the overall economic system.194  As 
Professor Horton, a veteran antitrust enforcer, recently argued from an 
evolutionary biology perspective, “large economic concentrations such as 
monopolies and oligopolies are vastly overrated in terms of their overall 
efficiency and positive impacts on the current economic system, and that 
                                                 
190
 Colin F. Camerer & Ulrike Malmendier, Behavioral Economics of Organizations, 
in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 235, 246, 260-64 (Peter Diamond & 
Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007).  For several recent surveys of the empirical literature see 
Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12 TENN. 
J. BUS. L. 65, 71-74 (2011), http://trace.tennessee.edu/transactions/vol12/iss2/4; Mark 
Armstrong & Steffen Huck, Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A Primer, 6 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 2 (Spring 2010); C. Engel, The Behaviour of Corporate Actors: 
A Survey of the Empirical Literature, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective 
Goods Preprint No. 2008/23 7-8 (May 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1135184. 
191
 Adams & Brock, Comment, supra note 188, at 1120. 
192
 OECD Dynamic Efficiencies, supra note 167, at 9. 
193
 Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew J. Heimert, Bureau of Economics, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Economic Issues: Merger Efficiencies at the Federal Trade Commission: 1997-
2007 26 (Feb. 2009), www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/0902mergerefficiencies.pdf (noting 
“substantial divergence in the efficiency acceptance rate” between FTC lawyers and 
economists). 
194
 Eleanor M. Fox, The Efficiency Paradox, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT 
THE MARK, supra note 73, at 81. 
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their dangerous impacts are increasingly underrated.”195 
c. Difficulties in Measuring Dynamic Efficiencies 
Dynamic efficiencies arise when firms innovate and foster technological 
change and progress.196  Although the most important in improving 
society’s well-being, dynamic efficiencies are the most difficult to 
measure.197  
One difficulty is determining when innovation benefits society.  
Innovation involves introducing something new, “a new idea, method, or 
device.”198  But not everything new is necessarily good.  For example, some 
financial innovations touted in the 1990s were heavily criticized for 
contributing to the financial crisis.199  So promoting dynamic efficiencies 
really means promoting socially beneficial innovations.  The problem is 
distinguishing between socially beneficial and harmful innovation for goods 
and services that are still under development and have not reached the 
market.200  A restraint may hinder innovation (such as preventing new 
subprime mortgages that profit banks but worsen the consumers’ financial 
condition), but leave society better off. 
 A second difficulty is measuring dynamic efficiency.  In the 1990s, the 
antitrust agencies offered a narrow view of an “innovation market,” namely 
                                                 
195
 Horton, supra note 49, at 473. 
196
 OECD GLOSSARY, supra note 140, at 23. 
197
 OECD Dynamic Efficiencies, supra note 167, at 10 (noting “the uncertainty 
inherent in innovative activity regarding its cost, timing, and the likelihood and extent of its 
commercial success, difficulties in measuring innovation itself, the problem of how to 
conceptually transform innovation into some measure of welfare, and informational 
asymmetry between the merging parties and the enforcement agencies.”). 
198
 WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 591 (1979) (defining innovation). 
199
 GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. 
MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 
(2009). 
200
 OECD Policy Brief, supra note 186, at 5 (recognizing the “almost always 
uncertainty about how much innovative activity will cost, how long it will take and the 
likelihood and extent of its commercial success”); Josef Drexl, Real Knowledge is to Know 
the Extent of One’s Own Ignorance: On the Consumer Harm Approach in Innovation-
Related Competition Cases (Dec. 3, 2009), Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, 
Competition & Tax Law Research Paper No. 09-15, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1517757. 
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“research and development directed to particular new or improved goods or 
processes, and the close substitutes for that research and development.”201  
But this assumes that the input--specialized research and development 
(“R&D”) assets or characteristics of specific firms--is a good proxy for the 
output, socially beneficial innovation.202  There are also problems in using 
outputs to measure innovation.  Patents and copyrights are both under-
inclusive in measuring innovation (in not capturing processes and products 
not subject to IP protection) and over-inclusive (not every patent or 
copyright is socially beneficial). 
A third difficulty is determining what hinders or promotes innovation, 
and to what extent greater concentration/market power fosters more 
innovation.203  The 2010 Merger Guidelines provide additional guidance of 
when mergers are likely to diminish innovation competition by encouraging 
the merged firm to curtail innovative efforts below the level that would 
prevail absent the merger.204  But the Guidelines leave many issues 
unresolved on evaluating a merger’s impact on innovation.205  At times, the 
competition agencies as part of their competitive effects analysis predict 
                                                 
201
 U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing 
of Intellectual Property § 3.2.3 (1995), http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf. 
202
 OECD Policy Brief, supra note 186, at 5 (recognizing host of complicating factors 
related to innovation). 
203
 STEVEN JOHNSON, WHERE GOOD IDEAS COME FROM:  THE NATURAL HISTORY OF 
INNOVATION 21 (2010) (discussing how openness and connectivity may be more important 
for innovation than competition); Stucke, Monopolies, supra note 50, at 509-17. 
204
 Compare 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 186, at § 6.4 with U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 0.1 n.6 (1992), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm (mentioning innovation in one 
footnote). 
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 Rosch, Next Challenges, supra note 115, at 9-10; see also Darren S. Tucker & Bilal 
Sayyed, The Merger Guidelines Commentary: Practical Guidance and Missed 
Opportunities, ANTITRUST SOURCE, May 2006, at 11-12, 
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/06/05/May06-Tucker5=24f.pdf (noting 
significant omission of innovation in agencies’ 1992 guidelines and 2006 commentary). 
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higher prices and less innovation post-merger.206 Given the difficulties in 
measuring and predicting dynamic efficiencies, the agencies seldom 
challenge mergers solely on dynamic efficiency grounds.207  
Despite the importance of dynamic efficiencies, antitrust policy still has 
inadequate tools to measure these efficiencies or assess the long-term 
effects of many restraints on dynamic efficiency.208 
3. How Current Antitrust Analysis Is Incomplete in Focusing on Some 
Efficiencies (Such as Short-Term Productive Efficiencies) and not Other 
Efficiencies and Inefficiencies 
 
Efficiencies today are used as a shield, namely as a defense to an 
otherwise anti-competitive merger.209  But if promoting efficiencies, as 
some courts say, is antitrust’s primary goal, then inefficiency should be a 
sword.  Courts and agencies–besides permitting mergers that yield 
efficiencies--should block mergers that yield greater inefficiencies.   
Conceivably a merger may yield greater efficiencies or inefficiencies.210  
                                                 
206
 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Commentary on the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines 18 (Mar. 2006), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.htm#42 (antitrust agencies “generally 
focus on the likely effects of proposed mergers on prices paid by consumers,” but at times 
allege in their complaints anti-competitive effects on non-price dimensions); Compl., In re 
Koninklijke DSM N.V., Roche Holding AG, & Fritz Gerber, FTC File No. 031 0064, 
Docket No. C-4098 (Sept. 22, 2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/dsmrochecomp.pdf (alleging among the acquisition’s 
anticompetitive effects its reducing the parties’ incentives to improve service or product 
quality or to pursue further innovation in the relevant market).  
207
 2011 ICN Survey, supra note 47, at 31 (noting one country’s observation that “in 
reality, the time horizon of reliable analysis often does not make it plausible to take into 
consideration long term effects, even if the broader conceptual framework would allow 
that”). 
208
 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 186, at § 10 (“Other efficiencies, such as those 
relating to research and development, are potentially substantial but are generally less 
susceptible to verification and may be the result of anticompetitive output reductions.”). 
209
 Id. 
210
 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (“Many 
people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, 
discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and 
rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to 
counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone.”); OECD GLOSSARY, supra 
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Accordingly, if market forces do not prevent mergers that yield greater 
inefficiencies, then antitrust enforcers and courts would calculate and weigh 
the multiple efficiencies and inefficiencies arising from a merger.  To do so, 
they need the tools to assess the likely allocative, productive, and dynamic 
efficiencies and inefficiencies arising from each merger.  They next must 
have the tools to weigh the efficiencies and inefficiencies (including their 
impact on the poor, whose marginal utility of income differs from wealthier 
consumers), along with the other benefits, costs, and risks posed by the 
merger.  The problem is that no such tools exist today.211 
Why don’t these tools exist?  One reason is that neither the antitrust 
agencies nor courts consider inefficiencies and other significant costs and 
risks from a merger, which while less susceptible to quantification, can 
inflict greater harm.  Why don’t the competition agencies then consider the 
inefficiencies and bring them to the courts’ attention?  One explanation is 
that promoting efficiencies is not their primary antitrust goal.  But if it is, 
another explanation is the agencies’ and courts’ belief perseverance in neo-
classical economic theories premised on rational market participants.  If one 
strongly believes that market participants are rational profit-maximizers, 
one can logically conclude that firms merge to maximize profits either 
legally (through productive or dynamic efficiencies and other lawful means 
(e.g., tax benefits)) or illegally (by lessening competition).  If the 
government cannot prove that the merger will lead to more market power 
                                                                                                                            
note 140, at 86 (discussing inefficiency when monopoly faces less incentive or competitive 
pressure to minimize costs of production, and increase the wasteful expenditures in things 
“such as maintenance of excess capacity, luxurious executive benefits, political lobbying 
seeking protection and favourable regulations, and litigation”); Roger Frantz, X-Efficiency 
and Allocative Efficiency: What Have We Learned?, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 434 (1992); 
Harvey Liebenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. “X-Efficiency,” 56 AM. ECON. REV. 392 
(1966). 
211
 OECD Dynamic Efficiencies, supra note 167, at 5 (“general agreement that proving 
a specific likelihood of claimed dynamic efficiencies and measuring their impact are 
difficult tasks for which there are no easy approaches. At present, quantitative assessments 
do not appear to be feasible.”). 
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(e.g., prices post-merger will increase above competitive levels), then the 
merger by default must maximize profits through legal means (e.g., 
efficiencies).212  Accordingly, there is greater concern over false positives 
than negatives.213 
This bi-polar outlook does not acknowledge the vast grey middle area of 
mergers (think AOL-Time Warner and Daimler-Chrysler), where bounded 
rational executives were overconfident about the efficiencies or merged to 
build empires or ego (e.g., acquisitions of Hollywood movie studios).214 
Market forces do not always punish the overconfident firms whose mergers 
destroy shareholder value.  Consequently, it is easier to endorse an 
efficiency goal if one makes simplifying, unrealistic assumptions about 
competition (static price competition) and market participants (rational, 
self-interested, fully informed). 
If promoting efficiencies indeed were the goal, current antitrust analysis 
is incomplete and at times leads to bad outcomes for the public.  In recent 
closing statements, for example, the DOJ highlighted the likely efficiencies 
                                                 
212
 DAVIDSON, supra note 52, at 72-73, 78-79; Adams & Brock, supra note 37, at 292 
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Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) (“Mistaken inferences and 
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the antitrust laws are designed to protect.” (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986))). 
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 WU, supra note 33, at 225. 
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from mergers in the highly concentrated telephone,215 satellite radio,216 and 
airline217 industries.  But the DOJ considered only one type of efficiency, 
namely short-term productive efficiency gains, and only those efficiencies 
that the merging firms identified.  The DOJ closing statements never 
address the mergers’ impact on dynamic efficiency or potential long-term 
costs.  
As one example, the DOJ predicted that Whirlpool’s acquisition of 
Maytag, which reduced the number of major appliance manufacturers in the 
United States from four to three, was unlikely to reduce competition 
substantially.218  The DOJ predicted that “any attempt to raise prices likely 
would be unsuccessful;” consumers instead would benefit from the 
merger’s estimated cost savings and other efficiencies.219  In reality, the 
DOJ was wrong.  Consumers ended up paying more (about 5 to 7 percent 
more for Maytag dishwashers and about 17 percent more for Whirlpool 
dryers) and had fewer choices post-merger.220 
The reality today is that courts and agencies cannot maximize efficiency 
as a goal unless they undertake a more extensive review.  They cannot 
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consider only some efficiencies (e.g., productive) that are easier to measure 
(e.g., combining all the manufacturing post-merger in the one modern low-
cost production facility).  They cannot rely on the merging parties’ 
efficiencies defense.  They would have to devote more attention to the 
harder to quantify, yet significantly more important, dynamic 
(in)efficiencies.221 
Ironically an efficiency goal would make the courts and agencies more 
skeptical about mergers yielding efficiencies; they would display greater 
concern over false negatives than they do currently over false positives. 
Many times efficiencies do not seem to motivate the merger.222  The 
efficiency claims are mostly developed by antitrust lawyers and hired 
experts, who sift through the companies’ documents and data, or extrapolate 
from the company’s past experiences.223 Thus an efficiency goal logically 
could lead to more active merger enforcement, whereby only those mergers 
where the efficiencies are substantiated and likely are permitted. 
4. Rule-of-Law Concerns if Promoting Efficiencies is Antitrust’s Goal 
If promoting efficiencies is antitrust’s primary goal, any legal 
presumption raises the risk of false positives and negatives.  Accordingly, 
the legal analysis must remain case and fact specific.  This lessens 
predictability, and increases compliance costs and rule-of-law concerns.224 
Predicting the dynamic, allocative, and productive efficiencies from the 
challenged merger (or restraint) affords the agencies, courts, and defendants 
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 OECD Dynamic Efficiencies, supra note 167, at 10 (although competition 
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ample discretion, with little assurance of accuracy, consistency, objectivity, 
and transparency.  Nations differ widely “as to how economic efficiency 
itself can be best achieved, depending in part on the different comparative 
advantages of the economy concerned.”225   
A merger, for example, may yield significant dynamic or productive 
efficiencies but higher prices.226  Some consumers may value lower priced 
homogenous goods; others are willing to pay more for greater innovation in 
the industry.  In different industries and societies, different efficiencies 
(e.g., dynamic, productive, and allocative) can increase (or decrease) to 
different degrees citizens’ well-being.227  The goal of promoting efficiencies 
does not inform the agencies and courts how to make these tradeoffs, and 
there is often no way to determine whether they made the proper trade-
off.228  
Promoting efficiency would require judges and agencies to engage in 
industrial policy, rather than to secure compliance with existing competition 
laws.  As the Supreme Court said nearly 40 years ago, “courts are of limited 
utility in examining difficult economic problems.”229 Also, Congress never 
intended the courts to decide antitrust cases based on the courts’ conception 
of the latest economic thinking.230  Not only are the courts and agencies 
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politically unaccountable for their industrial policies, they are ill equipped 
to resolve the complex economic issues that competition cases raise.231  
“The judicial power involves the responsibility for interpreting and 
administering the law and settling disputes,” noted one judge, 
“[r]esponsibility for resolving economic issues is a matter for the legislative 
branch of the Government.”232 
5. Problem of Efficiency as a Normative Goal 
Maximizing efficiency, from an utilitarian perspective, does not 
necessarily promote overall well-being.  There comes a point where the 
marginal cost from the incremental efficiency gain outweighs its benefit.   
Moreover, aside from the utilitarian cost-benefit framework, citizens 
may want to preserve other rights and values (such as economic freedom) 
for their own sake.  In rejecting a pure efficiency rationale for punitive 
damages, the Court observed that “[c]itizens and legislators may rightly 
insist that they are willing to tolerate some loss in economic efficiency in 
order to deter what they consider morally offensive conduct, albeit cost-
beneficial morally offensive conduct; efficiency is just one consideration 
among many.”233  Thus if citizens (i) do not prize efficiency for its own 
sake and (ii) have different thresholds where they prize other values over 
the incremental efficiency gain, then in any democracy, promoting 
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 Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U.S. 424, 439-40 (2001) (quoting 
Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 
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efficiencies cannot be sole goal.234  
Antitrust policy, rather than simply promote efficiencies, can be an 
important mechanism to disperse economic and political power and 
promote individual freedom.235  The concentration of private or 
governmental economic power is problematic--not only on utilitarian 
efficiency grounds—given its risks to any democracy. 
Consequently, courts must acknowledge their and the antitrust agencies’ 
limitations. Promoting efficiencies is a feasible goal for market 
fundamentalists and socialist central planners, who have a unifying theory 
of how markets work, how market participants behave, and how efficiencies 
can be maximized.  But in dynamic markets, the process is imperfectly 
understood; the outcomes are often indeterminate.236  There is no conscious 
design; no DNA from which one can estimate the probabilities of different 
outcomes; no tools to weigh the discounted values of the efficiencies and 
inefficiencies.  In reality the antitrust agencies and generalist courts do not 
know whether, and how often, they accurately assess the likelihood and 
magnitude of the allocative, productive and dynamic (in)efficiencies from 
mergers and other restraints of trade.237  They have neither the tools nor 
knowledge to undertake this analysis.  Even if they did, such analysis would 
raise significant rule-of-law concerns, and could conflict with important 
political, social, and moral values in any democracy. 
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D.  Why Ensuring Economic Freedom Never Unified Antitrust Policy 
U.S. courts have recognized the antitrust laws as a “charter of 
liberty.”238  They protect competitors’ economic freedom to compete.239 
They seek to maximize the “freedom of opportunity for consumers and for 
present and prospective businessmen as well.”240  Ensuring economic 
freedom was the fourth most popular goal in the 2007 ICN survey.241  
Indeed this goal encompasses other goals in the ICN survey, such as 
ensuring a level playing field for small and mid-sized enterprises,242 and 
promoting fairness and equality.243 Although promoting economic freedom 
has a pleasant democratic ring, it too cannot be the primary goal.   
Humans are social animals.  Invariably, the exercise of economic 
freedom by some market participants will constrain the freedom of 
others.244  The Court recognized early in the Sherman Act’s history that 
every contract among market participants conceivably restrains trade.245  A 
resale price maintenance (“RPM”) policy increases the manufacturer’s 
economic freedom (in setting the minimum or maximum retail price of its 
goods) while limiting the retailers’ freedom (in setting the price of the 
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manufacturer’s goods).  Conversely, a policy prohibiting RPM limits the 
manufacturer’s freedom, while increasing the retailers’ freedom.  Promoting 
market freedom, observed Professors Adams and Brock, can lead to the 
evils that the antitrust laws seek to prevent, namely “monopolization, 
oligopolization, collusion, and anticompetitive mergers and ‘joint 
ventures.’”246 
One classic example is Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, where the 
dominant newspaper refused to accept advertising from local merchants 
who advertised with the small competing radio station.247  Because of its 
monopoly of local advertising in the community and its practically 
indispensable coverage of 99 percent of the local residents, the newspaper 
forced numerous merchants to stop advertising with the radio station.  The 
monopolist asserted its economic freedom as a private business to select its 
customers and to refuse to accept advertisements from whomever it 
pleases.248  But in exercising its economic freedom, the monopolist 
infringed the economic freedom of the local merchants and radio station, 
which absent the restraint, would contract with one another.  The Court did 
not dispute the monopolist’s general right to refuse to deal, but recognized 
that: 
the word ‘right’ is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls; it is so easy 
to slip from a qualified meaning in the premise to an unqualified one 
in the conclusion. Most rights are qualified.  The right claimed by 
the publisher is neither absolute nor exempt from regulation. Its 
exercise of a purposeful means of monopolizing interstate commerce 
is prohibited by the Sherman Act. The operator of the radio station, 
equally with the publisher of the newspaper, is entitled to the 
protection of that Act.249 
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Consequently, promoting economic freedom inherently involves trading off 
some people’s freedom to promote others’.  To make that trade-off, one 
invariably relies on other values and goals besides economic freedom.  
Accordingly economic freedom cannot be the primary goal. 
E.  The End of the Policy Cycle 
With the quest for a single economic goal, antitrust progressively 
became less relevant during the past policy cycle.  Among the wreckage 
from the financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession are the laissez-faire 
economic beliefs.250 Bork began the last policy cycle by noting several 
antitrust paradoxes.251  Today antitrust suffers greater paradoxes.   
One paradox is that in the quest for a single economic goal, antitrust 
policy in the U.S. now lacks any clear unifying goal.  No consensus exists 
in defining or measuring consumer welfare or designing legal standards to 
further this goal.  Of course competition officials can agree that prohibiting 
certain egregiously anticompetitive behavior (such as price-fixing cartels) 
can promote their economic goal (whether it is consumer welfare, 
efficiency, or economic freedom).  But these restraints were condemned 
when antitrust recognized multiple goals.  Moreover in the context of other 
coordinated conduct (such as group boycott) and monopolization, the 
current economic goals cannot provide quantifiable objective benchmarks 
to guide and assess antitrust policy. 
To achieve consensus, as the ICN surveys reflect, the antitrust goal 
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accordingly becomes more abstract and less meaningful.  The surveyed 
competition authorities achieved greater consensus as the objectives became 
more open-ended and the relationship between the goal and specific actions 
necessary to promote the goal became less defined.   
A second paradox is that in the past decade the Court has complained 
about the state of federal antitrust law (e.g., the interminable litigation, 
inevitably costly and protracted discovery phase, and its fear over the 
unusually high risk of inconsistent results by antitrust courts), but it was the 
Court who has created this predicament.  During the past antitrust cycle, the 
Court increasingly relied on its fact-specific weighing standard, the rule-of-
reason,252 and a vague economic goal (consumer welfare) that 
accommodated different personal values and interpretation, and often 
pointed to no particular course of action.  
A third paradox is, as Professor Eleanor Fox describes, the efficiency 
paradox: “by trusting dominant firm strategies and leading firm 
collaborations to produce efficiency, modern U.S. antitrust protects 
monopoly and oligopoly, suppresses innovative challenges, and stifles 
efficiency.”253  While antitrust policymakers recognize dynamic 
competition as more important, in the past policy cycle, antitrust agencies 
and courts “tended to avoid dynamic efficiency analysis” focusing instead 
on a static price competition and productive efficiencies.254 Courts and 
antitrust agencies applied a light touch to merger review under a fear of 
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false positives and a belief that most mergers promote efficiencies, even 
though the empirical literature suggests the contrary.255  While the 
efficiencies defense developed in the past policy cycle, antitrust enforcers 
and courts did not account for post-merger inefficiencies or the competitive 
distortions in creating firms too-big-and-too-integral-to-fail.256 
A fourth paradox is the economic power paradox.  Our constitutional 
framework seeks to distribute power, rather than promote its consolidation 
or concentration.257  Despite the historical concerns about concentrated 
economic power, antitrust policymakers in the last policy cycle “no longer 
concern[ed] themselves with preventing bigness, and indeed tend[ed] 
instead to encourage large-scale enterprise for efficiency’s sake.”258  While 
we saw in nature the benefits of diversity,259 we disregarded in one of our 
most important industries, the financial services markets, the dangers of 
concentration and systemic risk.260 Despite the public and governmental 
concern about protecting small businesses from unfair competitive tactics, 
and the importance of small companies in promoting dynamic efficiencies, 
the Court now praises monopolies. 
A fifth paradox is that while trust, fairness, and prosocial behavior are 
vital to the functioning of a market economy,261 antitrust policy ignores 
these values, and treats market participants as amoral self-interested profit-
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maximizers.262 
A sixth antitrust paradox, observed Professor Jesse Markham, was how 
during the past policy cycle the government’s “laissez-faire policies . . . led 
to unprecedented government intervention in the private sector.”263  
III. IS A SINGLE UNIFYING GOAL A WORTHWHILE PURSUIT?  
As Part II shows, identifying a single antitrust goal, such as promoting 
consumer welfare, is easy.  The open-ended objective simply shifts the 
debate to defining the term and the means of attaining that end.  A single 
objective is always available; the trade-off is greater abstraction.  This Part 
examines whether pursuing a single goal is a worthwhile pursuit in the next 
policy cycle.   
In today’s global economy, a single, well-defined objective has benefits. 
Nations’ antitrust objectives can conflict. Unless the merging firms can 
carve out one jurisdiction, one country will impose its objectives on 
another.  Transparent, well-defined policy objectives can help increase 
convergence of the ensuing legal standards, harmonize enforcement among 
competition authorities, reduce compliance costs on industries, limit the 
ability of entrenched firms to secure state aid or legal barriers to protect 
their market power, and lower entry barriers for importers.   
But as this Part examines, the lack of a well-defined unifying goal is not 
for want of mental capacity or incentives.  This is not the case where we 
squeeze “the universe into a ball, To roll it toward some overwhelming 
question, To say: ‘I am Lazarus, come from the dead, Come back to tell you 
all, I shall tell you all.’”264  Antitrust simply does not lend itself to a single 
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well-defined objective.  
A.  As an Initial Premise, Antitrust Policy Ultimately Must Promote (or at 
Least Not Impede) Citizens’ Well-Being 
Competition, however defined, is not the ultimate end. Competition 
instead represents the means “to achieve broader government objectives for 
the economy or for a given industry.”265 
If competition is not an end, but the more efficient (or democratic) 
means to achieve other goals, this has three implications:  first, there must 
be one or more ultimate goals, with perhaps other intermediary goals. 
Second, one must have a form of competition in mind, and how, and under 
what circumstances, one’s conception of competition can promote or 
impede one’s ultimate objectives.  Third, one must understand how the 
formal legal and informal institutions can promote one’s conception of 
competition. 
As an initial premise, competition’s ultimate goal is to improve well-
being.266  Competition can be bitter.  But we take such bitters to improve 
overall well-being, not simply to be miserable.  If as a result of our 
competition policy our physical and mental health deteriorates, our isolation 
and distrust increases, and our freedom and self-determination decrease, 
then the policy is not worthwhile.  A competition policy, which simply 
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involves a rush for scarce resources, where many are trampled or left 
scrambling for the scraps, would appeal to the few who captured the 
resources.  So our conception of competition (as defined in part by our 
competition policy) must promote (or at least not impede) overall well-
being. 
Some will ask whether this is too much to ask of antitrust.  Let 
competition policy improve the allocation of scarce resources, reduce the 
costs of goods and services, and maximize overall wealth.  Leave well-
being to individual choice or supplementary governmental policies.  We do 
not require other laws, such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
regulations on frozen cherry pies,267 to promote overall well-being.  Why 
should antitrust bear this burden? 
One premise of our economic system of private enterprise is the 
importance of free competition.  The Small Business Act’s policy 
declaration summarizes this philosophy: 
The essence of the American economic system of private enterprise 
is free competition. Only through full and free competition can free 
markets, free entry into business, and opportunities for the 
expression and growth of personal initiative and individual judgment 
be assured. The preservation and expansion of such competition is 
basic not only to the economic well-being but to the security of this 
Nation. . . .268 
 
Congress’s policy statement incorporates three important premises.  First, 
competition does not exist independently of the legal and informal 
institutions.  As economist R.H. Coase said, “the legal system will have a 
profound effect on the working of the economic system and may in certain 
respects be said to control it.”269 
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Second, the types of competition (fair versus unfair) can vary depending 
upon the legal and informal institutions.270  The term “competition on the 
merits” invariably involves normative considerations of unfair 
competition.271  The legal and informal institutions provide the rules of the 
game necessary for that type of competition to function effectively;272 and 
thereby affect the market participants’ incentives.273  As economist 
Douglass North notes, “How the game is actually played is a consequence 
of the formal structure [e.g., formal rules, including those set by the 
government], the informal institutional constraints [e.g., societal norms and 
conventions], and the enforcement characteristics.”274  A market’s 
performance characteristics are a function of these institutional constraints.  
The rules will define the opportunity set in the economy.  Changing the 
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rules can lead to different outcomes.275  If the antitrust laws reward (or are 
indifferent to) monopolization, monopolies will be the likely outcome in 
markets conducive to monopolization.276  
 Third, some types of competition (“full and free”) promote overall 
well-being.  Other types of competition, such as the “exploitation of child 
labor, the chiseling of workers’ wages, the stretching of workers’ hours, are 
not necessary, fair, or proper methods of competition”277 and hinder well-
being.278 
Accordingly, legal institutions (including antitrust law)279 and informal 
ethical, moral, and social norms280 can promote overall well-being to the 
extent they promote fair competition and deter unfair competition. 
Consequently, the stronger our belief in the importance of preserving and 
expanding fair competition to promote overall well-being, the greater 
antitrust’s role in defining and deterring unfair competition.  In describing 
the antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, as “the 
Magna Carta of free enterprise,” the Supreme Court said the antitrust laws 
                                                 
275
 Kerber, supra note 272, at 16. 
276
 See NORTH, supra note 273, at 50. 
277
 Message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Congress Transmitting 
Recommendations Relative to the Strengthening and Enforcement of Antitrust Laws, Apr. 
29. 1938, S. Doc. No. 173, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938), reprinted in I.iv Kintner, supra 
note 50, at 3407. 
278
 Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 483 U.S. 27, 43 (1987) (construing 29 U.S.C. 
§ 202(a), where industries whose labor conditions are detrimental to the maintenance of the 
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of 
workers constitute an unfair method of competition). 
279
 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Boeing Co., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1229 (M.D. Fla. 
2004) (“fundamental objective of our antitrust laws is to promote fair competition for the 
benefit of all consumers”) (quoting Smalley & Co. v. Emerson & Cuming, Inc., 13 F.3d 
366, 368 (10th Cir. 1993)); American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 
F.2d 3, 14 (5th Cir. 1974) (tort of unfair competition “is an equitable concept, resting on 
general principles of fairness in business practices”).  
280
 See, e.g., Henrich et al., supra note 261, at 1480 (studying how informal religious 
norms can play an important role in supporting a competitive market economy); Mark 
Granovetter, The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 
33, 35 (2005) (“when economic and non-economic activity are intermixed, non-economic 
activity affects the costs and the available techniques for economic activity”). 
58 RECONSIDERING ANTITRUST’S GOALS [11-Aug-11 
“are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-
enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our 
fundamental personal freedoms.”281 Thus antitrust promotes fair 
competition, which in turn will promote the good life.282 
If antitrust’s ultimate goal is promoting well-being, our next issue is 
what constitutes well-being.  One definition is “the state of being happy, 
healthy, or prosperous.”283  But being prosperous or healthy does not 
necessarily mean greater happiness.  Well-being, as the OECD found, is 
multi-faceted. Promoting well-being entails promoting (i) material well-
being (income and wealth, housing, and jobs and earnings) and (ii) quality 
of life (health status, work and life balance, education and skills, social 
connections, civic engagement and governance, environmental quality, 
personal security, and subjective well-being).284  
Should antitrust law then promote (i) only material well-being or (ii) 
both material well-being and quality of life?  Advances in the happiness 
economic literature will enable policymakers to tailor governmental policies 
to promote well-being (or at least minimize sources of unhappiness, such as 
unemployment, mental illness, or inadequate health care).285  But it is 
apparent from the available evidence that one cannot maximize well-being 
by maximizing only one component.  
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After one’s basic needs are met, the economic literature shows, 
increasing income and wealth do not significantly increase well-being.286 
One of the few well-being metrics where America excels is material well-
being. The average household disposable income in the U.S. in 2008 was 
$37,690 per year, and average U.S. household’s financial worth was an 
estimated $98,440, which were much higher than the OECD averages, 
$22,284 and $36,808, respectively.287  Increasing aggregate material well-
being will not necessarily increase overall well-being.288  If a larger pie 
means greater wealth inequality, the wealthier will not be necessarily 
happier,289 and there will be greater incentives for the wealthy to use the law 
to safeguard their interests.290  Promoting wealth maximization (to the 
exclusion of other values) can also promote status competition, selfishness, 
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satisfaction (“the percentage of people who say they are dissatisfied has increased, and the 
percentage who say they are satisfied has decreased”)). 
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and envy, and marginalize other values correlated with greater happiness.291  
Thus the greater issue is fairness, namely how well the resources are 
distributed.292  Income inequality in the U.S. increased significantly during 
the past antitrust policy cycle.293  The U.S. has “the fourth highest rate of 
income inequality and relative poverty (17.3% of people [are] poor 
compared to an OECD average of 11.1%) in the OECD.”294 Other policy 
challenges involve quality of life issues, such as work and life balance,295 
social connections,296 safety,297 and environmental quality, including how 
efficiently the U.S. uses its natural resources.298 
Consequently in developed countries, like the United States, an antitrust 
goal to maximize wealth (to the exclusion of other goals) will not 
necessarily increase (and can reduce) overall well-being.  To maximize 
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well-being, any competition policy must balance the promotion of material 
wellbeing with quality of life factors such as freedom and self-
determination, while not deterring the exercise of compassion and 
interpersonal relationships. 
This is not difficult to imagine.  Competition in dispersing political and 
economic power can increase economic opportunity and personal 
autonomy,299 a key predictor of happiness.300 Citizens can choose to 
purchase from (and work for) firms that align with their personal religious 
and ethical values.301  When a firm engages in exploitative, unfair behavior, 
a competitive market provides alternatives.302  Positive sum competition 
provides richer social connections as people use their personal “vigor, 
imagination, devotion, and ingenuity” to help others.303  In promoting 
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 United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); OECD Well-
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productive and dynamic efficiencies, antitrust can promote sustainable 
consumption and production.  Greater productive efficiency can increase 
leisure time (which employees can use to contribute their unique skills to 
community voluntary work).304  In enabling these activities, which are 
correlated generally with healthier and happier people, competition can 
promote well-being. 
B.  Competition Policy Cannot Exclude Social, Political, and Moral 
Objectives 
If maximizing well-being entails a blended approach, the next issue is 
whether antitrust should promote only economic objectives. Limiting 
antitrust to economic goals, a former FTC chair said, frees competition law 
from normative judgments:  “Antitrust finally regarded enhancing consumer 
welfare as the single unifying goal of competition policy, and it used a 
framework that was based on sound economics, both theoretical and 
empirical.”305  Another antitrust official warned, “the inclusion of other, 
non-competition values is very dangerous, and we need to be very careful 
with it.”306  He cautioned the danger of getting involved “in politically 
charged issues by reference to populism,” which poses a “great danger of 
diluting our competition principles.”307  If competition authorities 
incorporate “extraneous social and political values into [their] decision 
making,” then their “competition-based analysis will be polluted by values 
that, while important, just do not belong in sound competition analysis.”308 
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This brings to mind the character General Jack D. Ripper’s observation 
in the movie, Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and 
Love the Bomb:  
war is too important to be left to politicians. They have neither the 
time, the training, nor the inclination for strategic thought. I can no 
longer sit back and allow Communist infiltration, Communist 
indoctrination, Communist subversion and the international 
Communist conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily 
fluids.309 
 
This subpart examines the fallacy of viewing social, moral, and political 
values as “diluting” antitrust analysis.  Neo-classical economic theory did 
not insulate antitrust authorities from lobbyists and political interest groups.  
Indeed Microsoft and Intel increased their lobbying efforts after the 
government commenced its antitrust prosecutions.310  Google, currently 
under investigation for antitrust violations, is spending even more on 
lobbyists (over $2 million alone between April and June 2011).311 
Consequently the danger lies not in the inclusion of non-economic concerns 
in antitrust’s goals, but as Part IV addresses, in the ensuing legal standard. 
1. Antitrust’s Inherent Trade-offs 
Even if antitrust technocrats, for normative reasons, limited antitrust to 
economic goals, they cannot avoid non-economic values.  Antitrust policy 
has inherent tradeoffs.  As Hayek noted, “[i]t is the essence of the economic 
problem that the making of an economic plan involves the choice between 
conflicting or competing ends--different needs of different people.”312  To 
resolve the trade-offs, one invariably relies on political, social, and moral 
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values.  
To start with an easy case, suppose residents of a New England 
community want to preserve their downtown, consisting largely of local 
merchants.  They oppose the entry of a big-box retailer, which would 
primarily serve the community.  The big-box retailer preaches to the 
villagers the virtues of its lower priced, high quality goods and increased 
consumer surplus.  The community still objects.  Should the government 
dismiss the citizens’ behavior as irrational and permit the big-box retailer to 
enter the New England community?  If so, government paternalism could 
override community preference. 
A competition official, when asked this hypothetical, likely would 
accept the consumers’ informed preference.  The government, as the Court 
recognized under its state action doctrine, can displace competition with an 
anticompetitive regulatory program.313  Here consumers can sacrifice the 
benefits of increased competition for other objectives, such as the pleasure 
(and value) they derive from preserving their downtown’s quaintness.314  
The harder case involves antitrust policy’s inherent trade-offs.  Suppose 
a merger of the town’s paper mills generates efficiencies that will benefit 
only the company, with no prospect of being passed along to consumers.  
Also suppose the efficiency gains (which include purchasing less 
electricity) outweigh the likely price increase to consumers.  Should these 
efficiencies be counted in favor of a merger?  The Antitrust Modernization 
Commissioners disagreed.315  Commissioner Carlton, a University of 
Chicago professor, argued yes.  Commissioner Jacobson disagreed: “Any 
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doubts that a consumer welfare standard better reflects the goals of the 
antitrust laws than a standard based on total welfare will serve only to 
undermine antitrust enforcement in the future.”316  
Other trade-offs include (i) a potential increase in inter-brand 
competition at the expense of reducing intra-brand competition,317 (ii) 
offsetting a merger’s anti-competitive effects in one market with pro-
competitive benefits in another market,318 (iii) mergers and restraints that 
yield dynamic efficiencies but also higher prices,319 (iv) mergers that yield 
greater productive efficiencies but reduce product variety,320 and (v) 
enabling firms to merge to attain productive efficiencies versus the political 
and social implications of increased concentration321 and the competitive 
distortions of firms too-big-and too-integral-to-fail.322 
Now suppose, in our example of the paper mill merger, that some of the 
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efficiencies will be passed on to some consumers, while other consumers 
will pay higher prices.  One drafter of the 2010 Merger Guidelines 
commented that the antitrust agencies may conclude that “the predicted 
harm to relatively few customers is not substantial enough to warrant an 
enforcement action, especially if the merger is expected to generate 
cognizable efficiencies that will benefit a larger set of customers so 
customers overall are likely to benefit from the merger.”323  This assertion, 
like the other trade-offs, raises several issues. 
First, should the antitrust agency determine whether some citizens 
should bear the brunt of a merger, so that other citizens may benefit?  
Suppose immediately after the merger, price will increase on the lower-end 
products, but the merger may provide “positive non-price effects (e.g., 
benefits from new or improved products) in the longer term.”324  This 
merger, as the OECD recognized, “puts investigators in the awkward 
position of needing to compare different concepts from different time 
periods–and possibly from two or more different markets with different sets 
of consumers.”325   
Second, it is questionable whether enforcers and generalist courts, 
consistent with the rule of law, can assess how “much quality enhancement 
or how many new products are necessary for some customers to compensate 
for a given expected price increase affecting other customers” in other 
markets.326  In assessing whether lower-incomer consumers (with a higher 
marginal utility of money) should have to pay higher prices post-merger so 
that wealthier consumers receive better quality products, the agencies’ 
decision will likely implicate political, social, and moral values. 
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Third, even if the agencies could make this trade-off solely on economic 
considerations, a political and social issue is whether they should.  Arguably 
individuals, as a quality of life matter, rather than an antitrust agency, 
subject to the risk of regulatory capture, should determine whether the 
potential innovation is significant enough to warrant the higher price.  But 
often consumers cannot make this decision independently.  Mergers can 
harm consumers in one market, while benefitting consumers in other 
markets.  So normative values come into play as to who should decide this 
trade-off:  the legislative branch, enforcement agency, or court?327 
One recent case illustrates antitrust policy’s inherent trade-offs.328  The 
state of California challenged under the antitrust laws a profit-sharing 
agreement among several large southern California supermarket chains 
during a labor strike.329  The major supermarkets advocated one trade-off:  
even if their temporary profit-sharing agreement had reduced the 
supermarkets’ incentives to compete in the short term, it increased their 
chances of winning the labor dispute with their unionized employees.330  
Thus the court would trade-off any short-term reduction in competition in 
exchange for lowering retail prices to consumers over the long term.  In 
defeating the union, the supermarkets could lower their employee wages 
and their costs, and thereby lower the retail prices charged to consumers.  
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Also by pooling profits over the short-term to defeat the union, the 
supermarkets could better compete against other retailers over the long-
term. 
Rather than evaluate the competitors’ profit-pooling agreement under 
the per se illegal or quick-look legal standards, the Ninth Circuit ultimately 
left the parties and lower court to ramble through the wilds of economic 
theory:  it instructed a “fair consideration of all factors relevant under the 
traditional rule of reason test, so as to determine if there are significant 
anticompetitive impacts and if so whether they outweigh any legitimate 
justifications.”331  Important here is that a decision will be made, and 
entering that decision will be social, political, and moral concerns. Thus, 
even under a pure economic approach, enforcers and courts will confront 
complex trade-offs, whereby one group will benefit, another will be 
harmed.  And the price is not always clear.  Each group can value the 
benefits and costs of the trade-off differently, and some values are 
incommensurable (such as fairness and liberty considerations in permitting 
some consumers to be exploited so that others benefit). 
2. Importance of Morals and Fairness to Support a Market Economy 
Individuals, as repeatedly shown in the empirical behavioral economics 
literature, do not predictably behave as neoclassical economic theory 
posits.332  They do not delineate between economic and non-economic 
considerations when considering fairness.333  They do not enter the 
marketplace with a blank slate.  Instead, years of socialization, and the 
internalization of social, moral, ethical, and legal norms have already 
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occurred.334 
Thus any competition policy, in a world with humans, transaction costs, 
coercion, and informational asymmetries, is built upon the normative 
judgments of legal and informal institutions.335  Principles of ethics, morals 
and fairness, rather than compromise, can strengthen a market economy.336 
As most rights are qualified,337 normative legal judgments are involved 
in creating, assigning, limiting, and protecting property rights338 and in the 
initial and current distribution of assets.  So one inquires the extent to which 
property rights have a social mortgage “to ensure that the basic needs of 
every [individual] are met and sustained.”339  Ultimately economics is not a 
value-free science,340 inoculated from normative judgments. 
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3. Praising Antitrust’s Purity Is Praising Its Irrelevancy 
Even if technocrats somehow could exclude social, moral, and political 
values from antitrust policy, they must still articulate how their work 
improves well-being (or at least for their influential constituencies).  
Antitrust monasteries are not feasible in democracies.  Competition 
authorities seldom have unrestricted endowments.  Nor would many 
politicians leave money outside the antitrust monastery so as to not pollute 
the technocrats inside.  Competition agencies compete with other agencies 
for funding.  So if antitrust policy is irrelevant to the pressing societal 
issues, then antitrust, relegated to a niche organization with little resources, 
is easier to marginalize. 
Moreover, a plea for antitrust purity can divorce antitrust technocrats 
from the public concerns.  Some antitrust goals are important to the public 
and Congress but dismissed by antitrust technocrats.  Take, for example, the 
goal of protecting small competitors.  In one recent survey, “[a]bout 8 in 10 
(81%) EU citizens agreed that small companies needed to be protected from 
large companies’ competition.”341 Indeed more citizens “totally agree[d]” 
with that statement than other statements considered antitrust gospel, such 
as competition between companies allows for more choice342 and better 
prices343 for consumers.344  This cannot be dismissed as European fancy.  
Protecting smaller competitors was one concern underlying the legislative 
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amendments to the Clayton Act, the primary antitrust statute involving 
mergers,345 and surveyed U.S. citizens had more confidence in small 
businesses than big firms.346 
But protecting small competitors, for some, is blasphemy.347 The 
conventional wisdom is that the antitrust laws protect competition, not 
competitors.348 
From the technocrats’ perspective, the citizens, even the highly-
educated,349 are ill-informed.  From the citizens’ perspective, the 
technocrats must recognize that protecting small companies represents an 
important value to be independently protected; alternatively, the 
technocrats, with their focus on static price competition and productive 
efficiencies, cannot otherwise see, as citizens working in the private sector 
can, the harms from concentrated economic power.  Small start-ups, as one 
recent study found, drive dynamic competition.  Start-ups that survive 
“have higher productivity levels and higher productivity gains than more 
mature establishments,” and help replace “lower productivity businesses 
with new, more productive ones, thereby increasing productivity overall.”350  
Start-ups create the bulk of private sector jobs in the United States.351   
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Consequently, antitrust officials who warn about social, moral, and 
political values polluting antitrust analysis are not arguing for sound 
competition analysis.352  They argue for an antitrust analysis divorced from 
reality, a world occupied by self-interested profit-maximizers, unconcerned 
about fairness and trust, in markets without transaction costs and property 
rights.  In short, they render antitrust irrelevant.  The surveyed ICN 
members considered “that the most important obstacle to their advocacy 
work surges from the different objectives and opinions held by other 
Governmental authorities.”353 Seeking to sequester competition goals from 
moral, social, and political values will not bridge this divide. 
IV. ACCOUNTING ANTITRUST’S MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES IN THE LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 
As Part III discusses, any country’s competition law likely will 
encompass, but not necessarily rank, multiple economic, social, moral, and 
political goals.  The issue is not whether competition policy should 
incorporate non-economic values.  Rather, as this Part discusses, the issue is 
the degree of freedom that courts and enforcers have in weighing multiple 
goals in their analysis. 
One issue is how to weigh multiple objectives, if as Part II discusses, 
each objective has shortcomings.  For example, promoting efficiency cannot 
be the primary goal, as all the antitrust scholars and policymakers, taken 
together, still would not know how to maximize dynamic, allocative, and 
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productive efficiencies in the long run.354  As a German Bundeskartellamt 
official said, we cannot pretend to know what in fact cannot be known.355  
Another issue is whether the goals are better achieved directly (like the goal 
of crossing the street) or obliquely.356 
In reconsidering antitrust’s goals, policymakers should look at the 
business literature, which after the financial crisis, is reconsidering 
capitalism, “one imbued with a social purpose.”357  In the past, the concepts 
of sustainability, fairness, and profitability generally were seen as 
conflicting.358  But these concepts are seen as reinforcing under the 
principle of shared value, which “involves creating economic value for 
society by addressing its needs and challenges” and enhances “the 
competitiveness of a company while simultaneously advancing the 
economic and social conditions in the communities in which it operates.”359  
Profits can be attained not through exploitation (e.g., creating demand for 
harmful or useless products), but through collaboration and trust and in 
better helping consumers solve their problems.  Sustainability, rather than a 
cost, represents an opportunity for companies to improve productivity and 
societal welfare.360 
So too important political, social, economic, and moral values can 
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reinforce, rather than undermine, any concept of fair competition.  Ideally 
the politically accountable legislature (but given Congress’s reticence, more 
likely the courts) would blend the multiple objectives into legal standards 
that comport with rule-of-law principles. 
A.  Blending Antitrust’s Objectives 
To illustrate how blending goals works, we can combine several popular 
competition goals:  Ensuring an effective competitive process by enhancing 
efficiency, while promoting economic freedom, a level playing field for 
small and mid-sized enterprises, and fairness.  In blending these goals, 
lawmakers can hope to expand the range of entrepreneurial opportunity 
seeking to satisfy any increasing consumer demand for choice. 
As Part III discusses, the U.S. economy relies on new entrants for 
productivity gains and job creation.  Promoting economic freedom and 
opportunity and ensuring a level playing field for small and mid-sized 
enterprises consequently will likely promote, rather than undermine, 
dynamic efficiency.361  In addition, promoting these blended goals can 
strengthen the network’s resilience.362  Ensuring a “multiplicity and 
diversity of independently innovating firms,” observed Professor Kerber, 
can (i) promote the “searching for new problem solutions and safeguarding 
the effectiveness of competition as a process of parallel experimentation and 
mutual learning,”363 and (ii) provide a faster adaptation to exogenous 
shocks.364 
The blended goal can also promote productive efficiencies.  A low to 
moderately concentrated industry with diverse competitors can offer greater 
benefits to competitors, than a highly concentrated industry.  One empirical 
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study found a positive correlation between industry variety and 
performance.365  In considering why the entire industry benefits when firms 
pursue a variety of competitive strategies, the study’s authors posit that with 
less variety, there will be less opportunity for the firms to learn of the 
changing conditions and demands and appropriate responses thereto.366 
Likewise, Michael Porter identified how competitors mutually gain from 
localized competition, such as knowledge spillovers, improving the quality 
of their labor pool, and strengthening their network of suppliers.367  A 
diversity of local competitors can spur variety in products, as competitors 
strive to differentiate from their rivals’ products, as well as in production 
techniques and strategies, which can lead to further innovation.   
1. A Blended Approach for Monopolist’s Exclusionary Behavior  
One concern underlying economic freedom is when monopolists 
through exclusionary behavior seek to stifle the introduction of variation or 
otherwise impede the market’s feedback mechanism.368 Entrenched firms 
jointly or unilaterally seek to limit the introduction of variation by entrants 
and consumers’ ability to experiment with new products or services.369  
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One recent example is Intel.370  The FTC alleged that the monopolist 
sought to block or slow the adoption of competitive products by, among 
other things, paying or otherwise inducing suppliers of complementary 
software and hardware products to eliminate or limit their support of non-
Intel microprocessors.  Intel allegedly induced computer manufacturers “to 
forgo advertising, to forgo branding, to forgo certain distribution channels, 
and/or to forgo promotion of computers containing non-Intel CPUs.”371  
Suppose Intel could prove during the complaint period that microprocessor 
prices actually declined at an annual rate of 42 percent (a price decrease 
greater than for any other high-technology product) and output of its x86 
microprocessors grew from 136.5 million to 324.7 million.372  If allocative 
and productive efficiency were the antitrust goals, the FTC would have a 
hard time showing that absent Intel’s conduct, prices likely would have 
been lower and output greater.  
But under a blended goal, the FTC could show how Intel’s conduct 
inhibited its competitors from effectively marketing their products to 
customers, which also harmed choice (and competition) at the downstream 
original equipment manufacturers (OEM) and consumer levels, and reduced 
the OEMs’ incentive and ability to innovate and differentiate their products 
in ways that would appeal to customers.373  Under a blended goal, the 
competition authority more likely would follow “the concept of rivalry and 
consumer choice as the essential conditions for guaranteeing competition 
and sustainable incentives for innovation.”374 
This blended approach is not novel.  The European Commission infers 
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anti-competitive effects when a monopolist “prevents its customers from 
testing the products of competitors or provides financial incentives to its 
customers on condition that they do not test such products, or pays a 
distributor or a customer to delay the introduction of a competitor’s 
product.”375  In curtailing the available antitrust defenses for a group 
boycott, the Supreme Court implicitly blended these goals.376  And as 
Hayek argued, it is “essential that entry into the different trades should be 
open to all on equal terms and that the law should not tolerate any attempts 
by individuals or groups to restrict this entry by open or concealed force.”377 
A blended objective would promote economic opportunity without 
unduly penalizing more efficient firms from competing.  Economic freedom 
does not mean economic equality.378  One cannot assume that all sellers 
have the same “best practices” and routines, or the same quality of goods 
and services.  Under the blended approach, antitrust would not require a 
competitor to degrade the quality of its products or services or otherwise 
punish firms that succeed because of their superior efficiency or product 
offerings.  So a business that loses sales because of its inability to solve the 
consumers’ problems “is not the victim of economic oppression, but of [its] 
own inefficient methods.”379 In determining whether the monopolist’s 
challenged conduct is exclusionary and unreasonably restrains other 
                                                 
375
 Communication from the European Commission—Guidance on the Commission’s 
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary 
Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (2009/C 45/02) & 22, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:045:0007:0020:EN:PDF.  
376
 Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (group 
boycotts cripple traders’ freedom to sell in accordance with their own judgment); 
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 16 (1945) (challenged boycott limits 
opportunity and initiative of potential entrants). 
377
 HAYEK, supra note 50, at 86. 
378
 BOK, supra note 285, at 95 (describing equal opportunity as “giving everyone a 
more equal chance to become sufficiently educated and informed to resist exploitation and 
to defend themselves by appealing to the courts or to their political representatives when 
arbitrary restraints and disadvantages do occur”). 
379
 Blake & Jones, Defense of Antitrust, supra note 240, at 398. 
78 RECONSIDERING ANTITRUST’S GOALS [11-Aug-11 
competitors’ economic freedom, the competition authority can consider 
whether the challenged conduct is capable of excluding an equally efficient 
competitor.380 
2. A Blended Approach for Media Industries 
Media industries provide another example of the importance in blending 
economic and non-economic goals.  In some industries, with high fixed 
costs and homogeneous products, consumers do not desire product variety. 
Consumers prefer mergers that enable firms to achieve economies of scale 
by rationalizing production lines.  But for media industries, consumers may 
desire product variety from competing independent news sources even at 
the cost of some efficiency. The product variety yields a desired outcome 
(vibrant marketplace of ideas), which in turn promotes the quality-of-life 
factors important for well-being.381 
Under a blended goal, cost-savings efficiencies are relevant, when they 
demonstrably yield greater output of better quality programming.382  But 
under a blended goal, antitrust policy will not focus entirely on short-term 
productive efficiencies and competitive advertising rates. This was the 
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DOJ’s mistake in the past antitrust policy cycle when reviewing radio 
mergers.  Consumers suffered as a result.   
In 1996, Congress and the FCC relaxed the media ownership rules.383  
They did so under the banner of promoting competition and reducing 
regulation “to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American 
telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new 
telecommunications technologies.”384  Not surprisingly, immediately after 
the 1996 Telecom Act, there was, one Clinton administration official 
remarked, an “explosion of radio mergers.”385 In analyzing radio mergers, 
the DOJ considered their economic impact solely with respect to advertisers 
and the rates they paid.386  Even though other possible product markets 
existed, such as listenership and programming, the DOJ consent decrees 
never addressed the merger’s likely impact on programming quality, 
listener choice, or on the marketplace of ideas.387  Despite the rising 
industry concentration, the DOJ challenged few radio mergers.388  It 
required firms to divest radio stations in only those highly concentrated 
markets where it predicted advertisers would likely pay higher rates.389 
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Although Congress amended the Clayton Act in 1950 to arrest 
“concentration in the American economy, whatever its cause, in its 
incipiency,”390 the DOJ official called the concentration in the radio 
industry “healthy” given the potential for efficiencies.391 The ensuing 
consolidation adversely impacted non-price competition, such as 
programming quality and programming choices for listeners.392  Moreover, 
the industry consolidation adversely affected advertising rates, which 
ironically was the DOJ’s sole focus.393  Mel Karmazin, the former head of 
commercial radio for Infinity Broadcasting and CBS and the current CEO 
of Sirius XM, recognized that commercial radio after the 1996 Act became 
“totally homogenized.”394 Karmazin advocated for radio consolidation 
“[s]trictly for business reasons. No one asked [him] if it was good for 
consumers.”395 
By blending goals, lawmakers can enable smaller media firms to grow 
through mergers.  But rather than embrace concentration as “healthy” and 
consider the mergers’ effect only on advertising rates, antitrust officials 
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would be skeptical about monopolies or tolerating mergers in already 
concentrated industries to yield additional productive efficiencies. 
B.  Risks and Benefits of a Blended Approach  
As Professor Louis Schwartz observed, “The difficult question is not 
whether non-economic considerations are a proper, indeed conventional, 
component of the antitrust calculus, but how to take them into account.”396  
A trade-off exists between antitrust goals and legal standards.  With a 
narrowly defined antitrust objective, one can use an open-ended, fact-
specific weighing standard, such as the rule of reason.  The specific goal 
limits the enforcers’ and courts’ discretion when weighing the facts, as the 
goal permits only one outcome.  Alternatively, one can have multiple (and 
conflicting) policy objectives, if they are synthesized into clear rules that 
market participants can internalize and follow. 
One sees this trade-off in past antitrust cycles.  Up until the late 1970s, 
the Court recognized antitrust’s multiple economic and non-economic 
goals.  Accordingly, the Court generally (but not always) sought four 
things.  First, it sought a legal standard that was administrable for generalist 
judges.397 With some exceptions, the Court turned to the legislative history 
or common law precedent as a basis for its standards.398 Second, the Court 
sought legal standards to enhance predictability.  For example, in devising 
the thirty percent market share presumption for mergers, the Court sought to 
foster business autonomy:  Unless business executives “can assess the legal 
consequences of a merger with some confidence, sound business planning is 
                                                 
396
 Louis B. Schwartz, “Justice” and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1076, 1080 (1979). 
397
 See, e.g., United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963) (“in any 
case in which it is possible, without doing violence to the congressional objective 
embodied in . . . [the statute], to simplify the test of illegality, the courts ought to do so in 
the interest of sound and practical judicial administration”). 
398
 Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 17, at 1402-03. 
82 RECONSIDERING ANTITRUST’S GOALS [11-Aug-11 
retarded.”399  The Court’s role was to provide clearer guidance on what was 
civilly (and criminally) illegal under the Sherman Act.  Third, the Court 
sought to prevent the lower courts from being bogged down in difficult 
economic problems, such as trade-offs between inter- and intra-brand 
competition.400  Fourth, not only was this weighing beyond its institutional 
competence, the Court recognized that the legislature, while subject to rent-
seeking, was more politically accountable than the judiciary; so Congress 
must make these normative trade-offs.401 
In the past policy cycle, the Court went the opposite direction. It 
increasingly emphasized one type of competition (static price competition) 
and one antitrust goal (consumer welfare) and deemphasized antitrust’s 
political, moral, and social objectives.  The Court increasingly narrowed the 
applicability of its per se illegal standard and broadened the applicability of 
its more fact-intensive, case-specific rule-of-reason inquiry.402   
One risk of the blended goal approach, therefore, is incorporating 
multiple goals into the Court’s prevailing legal standard, the rule-of-reason.  
One cannot have, consistent with the rule of law, a fact-specific weighing 
standard and multiple policy objectives.  Having the agencies and courts 
blend goals in every antitrust case is a recipe for disaster.403  It is 
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questionable whether antitrust enforcers and courts can operationalize 
multiple goals in a systematic fashion.404  Moreover, allowing them to blend 
goals provides greater freedom to make errors and be politically captured. 
Accordingly, if courts and antitrust enforcers acknowledge antitrust’s 
traditional political, social, and moral goals, then the rule of reason cannot 
be antitrust’s prevailing legal standard.  Instead, they must blend such goals 
into clearer rules and legal presumptions.  Ultimately, the debate is which is 
the better trade-off: a single well-defined goal/rule-of-reason standard 
versus multiple goals/clearer rules. 
As this article discusses, the quest for a single well-defined goal has 
failed.  Thus antitrust is adrift under the rule-of-reason.  On the other hand, 
one drafter of the 2010 Merger Guidelines, in praising the Guidelines’ 
flexibility, doubted the business community’s desire to return to the 1960s 
antitrust policies: “Accounting for the real-world business conditions in 
which a merger takes place is worthwhile, even if doing so means that some 
simplicity must be sacrificed to achieve greater accuracy in merger 
enforcement.”405  
On one level, he is correct.  Companies seeking to merge in highly 
concentrated industries prefer a fact-intensive weighing standard than a 
presumption of illegality.  At times a competitively neutral or beneficial 
merger violates the simpler standard.  Moreover, the rule of reason enables 
the agencies and courts to respond flexibly to resolve novel problems that 
continually emerge over time. 
But this thinking, common in the past antitrust cycle, rests on two 
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assumptions:  first for most mergers and restraints a fact-intensive rule-of-
reason analysis yields greater accuracy; second, the business community 
prefers the rule-of-reason analysis.  These assumptions, as I explore 
elsewhere,406 are empirically suspect.  No one knows whether the 1992 or 
2010 Merger Guidelines increased accuracy, as no one systemically 
evaluated post-merger whether the agency accurately predicted the merger’s 
competitive effects.  Indeed, by weighing some factors (claimed 
efficiencies) and not others (editorial competition), as the DOJ’s review of 
radio mergers reflects, the fact-intensive inquiry can lead to a worse 
outcome—higher ad rates, poorer quality, and a less robust marketplace of 
ideas.  There is no empirical evidence that courts and antitrust enforcers 
systematically optimize efficiency across industries through its vague rule-
of-reason standard. 
Nor is there any evidence that firms prefer the costly, time-intensive 
rule-of-reason analysis to clearer rules.  Several factors suggest that the 
contrary.  First, simpler rules that emphasize a limited number of structural 
factors can facilitate “both enforcement decision-making and business 
planning which involves anticipation of the Department’s enforcement 
intent.”407  If courts, with the assistance of antitrust lawyers, have difficulties 
applying the rule-of-reason, corporate counsel will also have a hard time 
advising their clients on the conduct’s legality, and it will be hard for 
employees to internalize norms of what is reasonable and unreasonable 
behavior.  
Second, as private and public antitrust enforcement increases globally, 
the costs from uncertain and inconsistent legal outcomes will likely 
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increase.  Thus the demand for convergence increases.  Convergence can 
occur on two levels:  goals and/or legal standards.  As the ICN surveys 
show, competition authorities have not converged, nor will they likely 
converge, on a single well-defined antitrust goal. The newer antitrust 
regimes are unlikely, especially after the financial crisis, to regress to a 
simplistic conception of competition and quest for a single economic goal.  
Countries that are adopting or revising their competition laws are not 
condemned to repeat the failures of U.S. antitrust policy, such as debating, 
as some Chicago and post-Chicago school adherents did, over a single 
economic goal. 
Consequently, any global convergence will be on the legal standards. 
With different antitrust objectives, however, one cannot expect the same 
legal standards.  So the convergence will not be over the substance of the 
standard, but the extent to which the legal standard conforms to rule-of-law 
principles.  Multi-national companies likely will demand convergence on 
legal standards that provide greater transparency, objectivity, accuracy, and 
predictability. They increasingly will demand clearer rules that their 
employees can easily internalize (and reduce compliance costs), that will 
bind them and their competitors, and that will enable them to reasonably 
anticipate what actions would be prosecuted so they can channel their 
behavior in welfare-enhancing directions.408  As the recent ICN survey 
observed, “A clearly set and uniformly enforced standard is, therefore, of 
utmost relevance for enforcement agencies, the business community and 
final consumers.”409  Accordingly, any future convergence will not be over 
antitrust’s goals (that effort proved unsuccessful in the past policy cycle) or 
on particular legal standards.  Any convergence will come initially from 
increasing the transparency of antitrust’s legal standards (and bringing them 
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closer to the rule-of-law ideals).   
This makes the Court’s rule-of-reason standard an unattractive export, 
especially to countries with less developed judiciaries.  Firms will unlikely 
want to waste the extraordinary time and expense of a rule-of-reason 
analysis in China, Russia, the United States, or European Union.  This does 
not mean a return to per se illegal standards or death of the rule of reason, 
which courts and agencies could continue to employ in novel cases.  Instead 
for most run-of-the-mill restraints (such as RPM), the demand for, and 
supply of, more administrable standards, such as presumptions of illegality, 
with well-defined exceptions or defenses, will increase.  The challenge will 
be “how to strike a balance between the gains of a more effects-based 
approach and a higher degree of tailor-made decisions on the one hand, and 
the extra resources that are needed to achieve this and less legal certainty on 
the other hand.”410 
As the Court neglected in the past antitrust cycle, “[l]egal requirements 
are prescribed by legislatures and courts, not by economic science.”411  To 
the extent economic theories continue to lead the U.S. courts, the trend in 
economics is toward more complex, yet realistic, conceptions of 
competition and market participants.  Accordingly, businesses and the 
antitrust bar will be more skeptical about enforcers’ and courts’ abilities to 
predict competitive outcomes or maximize efficiency in those markets 
through the rule of reason.  They increasingly will demand simpler 
standards, more in accord with the rule of law, that incorporate antitrust’s 
blended goals. 
Thus, in the next policy cycle, antitrust’s legal standards can shift in two 
ways.  First, as recently signaled in linkLine, the Court can shift from a 
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“case-by-case” rule-of-reason analysis, which focuses on the “particular 
facts disclosed by the record”412 to simpler antitrust standards and rules 
“clear enough for lawyers to explain them to clients.”413 Second, the 
standards may shift, whenever feasible, from directly regulating market 
participants’ behavior to maintaining a competitive structure and preserving 
freedom therein. 
Besides increasing demand for better legal standards, a blended goal 
approach increases antitrust’s salience. Currently to achieve consensus, 
antitrust relies on ill-defined goals, like promoting consumer welfare.  The 
current debate over a total versus consumer surplus standard may interest 
antitrust technocrats, but few others.  Moreover, the debate over antitrust 
goals is no longer a domestic affair. 
One question is why should countries adopt antitrust laws.  With the 
realignment of economic power, the future debate over the purpose of 
antitrust law will likely be between a “Democracy Consensus” and 
“Authoritarian Consensus.”  To the extent the Beijing Consensus continues 
in its present form (a far from certain conclusion414), and to the extent 
maximizing productive and allocative efficiency is antitrust’s goal, then 
China can claim the advantage.  The authoritarian government can claim 
that the rule of law, democracy, and individual freedoms are unnecessary to 
secure this economic goal.  Indeed antitrust is one of several industrial 
policies to promote efficiency.  
The Democracy Consensus, however, can reply that antitrust’s primary 
aim is not simply to lower price, but to prevent the formation of powerful 
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firms and state-controlled enterprises that threaten a dynamic economy and 
democracy.  The “competitive system,” wrote Hayek, “is the only system 
designed to minimize by decentralization the power exercised by man over 
man.”415  The Democracy Consensus, consistent with this broader concept 
of competition, can emphasize the importance of economic, personal, and 
political freedoms for their own sake, as well as their promoting dynamic 
efficiencies and well-being.  Antitrust’s salience accordingly increases. 
CONCLUSION 
Other than for idealists, competition policy in any democracy with 
reasonable pluralism cannot be reduced to a single, well-defined goal.  Any 
antitrust policy, which seeks to promote well-being, must balance multiple 
political, social, moral, and economic objectives. 
The quest in the United States for a single economic goal was a failure.  
No consensus was ever reached on a specific well-defined goal.  The quest 
did not significantly improve antitrust analysis or align it closer to rule-of-
law principles.  Antitrust’s current objectives of promoting consumer 
welfare and efficiency are poorly defined.  Its prevailing rule-of-reason 
legal standard fares poorly under rule-of-law principles.  The quest 
distanced antitrust from important policy issues (such as systemic risk) and 
rendered antitrust less relevant. 
Consequently now is the time to reconsider antitrust’s political, social, 
and moral concerns.  In reconsidering the goals of competition as a means 
to secure political, economic, and individual freedoms, antitrust can be 
more responsive to the citizens’ concerns about promoting well-being.  
With a blended goal approach incorporated in better legal standards, 
antitrust, in the next policy cycle, will be harder to marginalize. 
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